Isn't it said that unless the wind is blowing can we see the fowl's anus!!
Long live Mr. President of LRC and Governor of annexed SW Region
MF Yembe
On 7/5/12, Dennis Tambe <dbtmamfe@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> Dr Susungi,
>
> Thanks again for this information which confirms the dastardly politics of
> yesterday. Mr S.T. Muna and KNDP are seen here bullying their way ("...we
> need not take part in discussing the constitution or have not taken part in
> directing the action taken....") through the Southern Cameroons House of
> Assembly towards obtaining tacit approval for KNDP's (not the people of
> Southern Cameroon's) Federal Constitution.
>
> The Opposition pliantly and timidly went along with the tacit approval
> motion (naively signing the death warrant of Southern Cameroons) certainly
> for fear of being blackmailed by KNDP before omnipotent Ahidjo as ardent
> enemies of reunification.
>
> SCNC and others who romanticize about Southern Cameroons/West Cameroon can
> now see the turpitude that bedeviled Anglophone politics. Cloak and dagger
> politics prevailed with impunity. Anglophone interests were sacrificed by
> "leaders" who were more intent on political spoils for themselves and their
> entourage. This same cloak and dagger politics prevailed through 1972.
>
> Southern Cameroons and West Cameroon are as dead as door nails and are
> buried in the sepulcher of eternity. Long live The Republic of Cameroon and
> its policies of decentralization and regionalization.
>
> Mukefor Dennis Besong Tambe
> Gubernatorial Aspirant
> SW Region.
>
>
> To: cameroon_politics@yahoogroups.com
> CC: camnetwork@yahoogroups.com; cameroons_sdf_party@yahoogroups.com;
> cameroonfinland@yahoogroups.com; ambasbay@googlegroups.com;
> standardtribune@ymail.com; thepostnp@yahoo.com; thestarheadlines@yahoo.com;
> eugenendindi@yahoo.com; eugene.nforngwa@standardtribune.com;
> epiendengu@yahoo.com; edenmedia@yahoo.co.uk; recorderspecial@gmail.com;
> wimbum@yahoogroups.com; sdf-forum@yahoogroupes.fr;
> thinkexchange@yahoogroups.com
> From: nsusungi@yahoo.com
> Date: Wed, 4 Jul 2012 15:26:49 -0700
> Subject: [cameroon_politics] Motion to Adopt the Draft Federal Consitution
> by the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Tande,
>
> The only importance that I give to the Pre-plebiscite Resolution on
> Reunification is that it served as the basis for drafting the constitution
> of the Federal Republic of Cameroon which was discussed in Foumban and
> subsequently adopted by the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly on
> 18.9.1961. Consequently whether there was a union treaty that was ratifed
> and sent to the UN Secretariat under Article 101 or the UN Charter becomes a
> mote point.
>
> I have not read J.C. Ngoh's book and I dont know his sources; but I have
> the a copy of the proceedings of the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly of
> 18.9.1961 and let me reproduce for all of you the motion regarding the draft
> constitution.
>
> Motion to adopt the Draft Constitution of the Federal Republic of Cameroon
> on 18.9.1961
> Minister of Finance (Honorable Solomon Tandeng Muna): Nearly all of us in
> this House, although we need not take part in discussing the constitution or
> have not taken part in directing the action taken, in one way or another, we
> have stood among people criticizing the constitution, propounding another
> one and all the pros and cons of this Federal Constitution are quite fair to
> most of us.
> Sir, I think it is quite proper that this action taken by ourselves for our
> country goes into record in our hands, because in the heart of our country,
> certainly, people will say "when our leaders at one time faced the storm and
> wanted the people of the territory to voice all their difficulties, they all
> came together and approved a constitution for our united country"
> Mr. Speaker Sir, I am quite optimistic that we the leaders have promulgated
> a useful, a good constitution, which under a stable government, which if
> handled by a people who are God-fearing, we shall lead this nation to a very
> successful end.
> Mr. Speaker sir, I don't want to belabor the motion. It is explicit and I
> hope honorable members will give it the blessing it deserves. Sir, I beg to
> move.
> Motomby-Woleta (Opposition Spokesman): Mr. Speaker sir, I rise to second
> the motion. And in doing so, sir, I wish to say that this side of the House,
> in our determination to help along unification, we shall not abdicate our
> right to criticize, urgently if need by, whatever measures are to be taken
> in this territory, which we feel would not be to the best interest of the
> people. I was saying last time sir that we cannot give tacit approval to
> the way the proceedings, or the bringing about, or the formulation of this
> constitution was handled by our colleagues of
> the KNDP.
> …….
> ……..
> ……
> After the lengthy speech of Motomby Woleta, the Draft Federal Constitution
> was unanimously adopted on 18.9.1961, paving the way for its promulgation on
> 1st October 1961.
> Tande, there is absolutely no question about the fact that the draft
> constitution of the Federal Republic of Cameroon was tabled as a motion on
> 18.9.1961 or that it was unanimously adopted by our democratically elected
> leaders.
> Dr. Susungi
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> --- On Wed, 7/4/12, Dibussi Tande <dibussitande@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
> From: Dibussi Tande <dibussitande@gmail.com>
> Subject: Re: [cameroon_politics] Why it is misleading to say that there was
> no Legal Reunification
> To: cameroon_politics@yahoogroups.com
> Cc: "camnetwork@yahoogroups.com" <camnetwork@yahoogroups.com>,
> "cameroons_sdf_party@yahoogroups.com" <cameroons_sdf_party@yahoogroups.com>,
> "cameroonfinland@yahoogroups.com" <cameroonfinland@yahoogroups.com>,
> "ambasbay@googlegroups.com" <ambasbay@googlegroups.com>, "standardtribune"
> <standardtribune@ymail.com>, "thepostnp" <thepostnp@yahoo.com>,
> "thestarheadlines" <thestarheadlines@yahoo.com>, "eugenendindi"
> <eugenendindi@yahoo.com>, "eugene.nforngwa"
> <eugene.nforngwa@standardtribune.com>, "epiendengu@yahoo.com"
> <epiendengu@yahoo.com>, "edenmedia" <edenmedia@yahoo.co.uk>,
> "recorderspecial@gmail.com"
> <recorderspecial@gmail.com>, wimbum@yahoogroups.com,
> sdf-forum@yahoogroupes.fr, thinkexchange@yahoogroups.com
> Date: Wednesday, July 4, 2012, 4:04 PM
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Hi Nfor Susungi,
>
>
>
> I think, you're giving this particular document much more importance than it
> deserves. This was never a binding agreement much less an international
> treaty. It was a working document, and at best, a road map. In fact, this is
> just one of the many resolutions and communiques signed by Southern
> Cameroons leaders and Ahidjo during the period in question. Contrary to what
> you claim, the British were very well aware of the October 1960 conference
> which was convened at their behest. As Julius Ngoh points out clearly in his
> book, The Untold Story of the Cameroon Reunification: "In the opinion of the
> British government, a clear statement had to be made on the form of
> reunification, and when and how it would be implemented. In this connection,
> Ahidjo and Foncha held a series of meetings in Yaounde on 10, 11 and 13
> October 1960..." Ngoh goes on to explain why the document signed after the
> conference "was a mere piece of paper," and why "Ahidjo had taken them
> [i.e., the KNDP delegation comprising Foncha, Muna Jua and Effiom] for a
> ride."
>
>
> It is worth pointing out that the resolution in questions was just one of
> three documents that came out of the meeting. To demonstrate how little
> value these documents had in the grander scheme of things, one of these
> documents clearly stated that "the implementation of reunification cannot be
> automatic but gradual," with Jua talking of a separate existence of "at
> least five years." (see Malcolm Milne's No Telephone to Heaven for details).
> Well, we all know how well this resolution was implemented.
>
>
> So my advice is that we should read and interpret this and other pre-1961
> documents with a certain amount of circumspection or else we will
> inadvertently or deliberately engage in revisionism.
>
>
>
> You also state that the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly adopted the
> draft Federal Constitution on 18.9.1961. A reading of the motion that was
> submitted to the house tells a different story. Let's read some more from
> Julius Ngoh:
>
>
> ".. what the SCHC and SCHA adopted on 5th and 18th September 1961
> respectively was the motion to the "brotherly" atmosphere in what finally
> became the Federal constitution. It was not the adoption and/or ratification
> of the Federal Constitution per se. The motion which was tabled by S.T. Muna
> did not request for the adoption and/or ratification of the constitution but
> rather for the approval of the "action of the leaders" of both Southern
> Cameroons and the Republic of Cameroon and the "brotherly manner in which
> they... conducted the negotiations."
>
>
>
> In short, what the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly adopted in September
> 1961 was a mere "motion of support", to use today's political lingo...
>
>
> The reason for this "omission" is a very simple one; as the Southern
> Cameroons Attorney General explained to Jua during the Yaounde Tripartite
> Talks, "by virtue of the terms put at the plebiscite, whatever Constitution
> is accepted by East Cameroon, West Cameroon is bound to accept it..." - the
> price that Southern Cameroons paid for not negotiating and finalizing the
> federal constitution BEFORE the plebiscite.
>
>
>
> Dibussi
>
>
>
> On Fri, Jun 29, 2012 at 6:43 AM, Nfor N Susungi <nsusungi@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Why it is misleading to say that there was no legal Reunification.
> By Dr. Nfor N Susungi
>
> 1. My attention was drawn to a recent interview by Hon. Ayah Paul Abine
> in which he stated that "there was no legal document on reunification".
> This was further stated on his Facebook page. I am prompted to react
> because Hon Ayah Paul lends to this statement his status of a man of law.
> Any kind of clarification on reunification must be based on a dispassionate
> review of the facts (in the legal sense of the word). What are the facts as
> we know them?
> 2. The starting point for discovering what really happened on October
> 1, 1961 is to look at a document which was signed in Yaoundé by President
> Ahidjo and Prime Minister John Ngu Foncha on 14.10.60 innocuously entitled:
> Joint Communique. In this document, the Cameroun Republic, represented by
> President Ahmadou Ahidjo and Prime Minister Charles Assale and the British
> Southern Cameroons represented by John Ngu Foncha agreed on the terms and
> conditions for merging the two territories to form a federal union, in the
> event that the people of the British Southern Cameroons vote in favor of
> joining the Cameroun Republic in the UN plebiscite that was scheduled for
> February 11,
> 1961.
> 3. The term Joint Communique was a misnomer because, in reality, it was
> an agreement between two sovereign states as attested by signatories to the
> document.
> 4. The key question is whether the Joint Communique which Ahidjo,
> Assale and Foncha signed in Yaoundé on 14th October 1960 can be construed as
> a legally binding union agreement between the British Southern Cameroons and
> the French Cameroun Republic. The simple answer is that it was not intended
> to be that. It is now clear that it was merely a conditional agreement
> which would only become operable in the event that the people of the British
> Southern Cameroons voted for the 2nd option in the plebiscite of 11th
> February 1961. If the people had voted for the 1st option of integration
> into the
> Nigerian Federation, the Joint Memorandum would automatically become
> useless.
> 5. We are told elsewhere that Foncha was keen on concluding a deal with
> Ahidjo simply because he needed a document which he can show the British
> Government during a future Conference in the UK that he was serious about
> pursuing the 2nd option with Ahidjo.
> 6. Foncha and the KNDP never really wanted to join Cameroun Republic.
> According to classified documents, it is Dr. Endeley who insisted that the
> 2nd option should be to join Cameroun Republic because he thought that the
> prospect would frighten people to vote to remain in Nigeria. Foncha's party
> wanted total independence as the 2nd option; but this option was ruled out
> at the UN in 1959 when John Ngu Foncha, N.N Mbile, and Ndeh Ntumazah all
> testified before the UN 4th Committee in October 1959 that the British
> Southern Cameroons could not stand on its own.
>
> 7. The first problem with the Yaoundé Agreement (Joint Communique) was
> that although it was conditional on the outcome of the 11th February vote,
> it was nonetheless a document binding two states separated by
> internationally recognized borders. That automatically gave it the
> character of a treaty. However, the document was legally flawed because
> the Southern Cameroons government could not enter into such a "treaty" with
> a sovereign state (Cameroun Republic) without the authority of the UK, the
> Administering Authority. But once it was signed by Foncha against Ahidjo,
> who was the President of a sovereign state, it became
> difficult to rectify the mistake. It was not Ahidjo's business to know
> whether Foncha had the power to sign "for and on behalf of the government of
> the Southern Cameroons" or not.
> 8. The second problem with the Yaoundé Agreement was that it spelled
> out the final boundaries of the federal union between the British Southern
> Cameroons and the French Cameroun Republic, even though the Opposition
> parties had not been involved in its negotiation. This was a violation of
> the guidelines which the British Ambassador stated to Ahidjo and Foncha
> during the first meeting held in Buea from 15-17 July 1960 in which he made
> it clear that the Opposition (CPNC) should be involved in final negotiations
> with the Cameroun Republic and final negotiations should be done between Her
> Majesty's Government and the Cameroun
> Republic.
> 9. The logic of the involvement of the Opposition Parties in
> negotiations with the Cameroun Republic was based on reciprocity because
> Foncha led the Southern Cameroons Opposition delegation to the Nigerian
> constitutional Conference held in Lancaster House in the UK in 1957 and
> under the 1958 Constitution, it was agreed that in the event of Nigeria
> becoming independent, Southern Cameroons can, if it wants, join it as a
> Region.
> 10. At the Lancaster House Conference of 1957, the Delegation for the
> Southern Cameroons governing party (KNC) consisted of: Dr. Endeley
> (Premier), John Takinang Ndze, HRH Fon Galega II, P.A Aiyuk and Victor
> Mukete (Adviser). Meanwhile the KNDP was represented by John Ngu Foncha and
> Augustine Ngom Jua (Adviser) and the KPP was represented by P.M Kale and N.N
> Mbile (Adviser). Mr JO Field and the British Government felt that, having
> participated at the 1957 Conference, Foncha and Jua would have understood
> that constitution making, in the Lancaster House tradition, must always be
> an all parties affair. Foncha, Muna, Jua, Kemcha and Effiom ignored this
> tradition
> and went on to sign a document which has since locked the Southern
> Cameroons into a weak position vis-à-vis the Cameroun Republic. But they
> came back from Yaoundé believing that they had done a fantastic job.
> 11. The catastrophic mistake which was committed by Commissioner JO
> Field is that when Foncha, Muna, Jua and Kemcha took off for Yaoundé for the
> 3rd round of negotiations with President Ahidjo, the Commissioner did not
> expect them to succeed. The unexpected "success of Foncha's delegation
> took the British Government and the Opposition by surprise and changed the
> course of Southern Cameroons history. The British Government initially took
> the agreement lightly because it was still believed that the 1st plebiscite
> option of joining Nigeria would prevail and render the Yaoundé Agreement
> caduque.
> 12. If the outcome of the plebiscite was that the people of the Southern
> Cameroons had voted for integration into Nigeria, the Yaoundé Agreement
> would have automatically become useless. However, when the outcome of the
> plebiscite favored reunion with Cameroun Republic, the Yaoundé Agreement
> (Joint Communique ) became a legally binding agreement between two states,
> whose terms and conditions had to be executed as required by UN General
> Assembly resolution 1608 (XV). But it was too late to expand the
> boundaries of that vague agreement.
> 13. Curiously the Administering authority simply went along with it and in
> so doing, the implicitly ratified the Yaoundé Agreement by acquiescence.
> The British Government still had full sovereign authority to step in and
> correct any deficiencies in the Yaoundé Agreement; but they did not do
> anything. It is at this stage that legal scholars can opine whether,
> having scaled through the obstacle of the plebiscite result, the Yaoundé
> Agreement had now been automatically transformed into a binding Union
> Agreement between the British Southern Cameroons and the Cameroun Republic.
> It is extremely difficult to argue that, under international law, this is
> not
> so.
> 14. Curiously when UNGA Resolution 1608 (XV) was tabled at the UN General
> Assembly, the Ahidjo government voted against it. The Southern Cameroons
> government could have used the negative vote of the Ahidjo Government
> against UNGA Resolution 1608 (XV) as grounds for repudiating the Yaoundé
> Agreement, whether it was considered as a binding union agreement or not.
> Legal conditions regarding contract repudiation are very clear.
> 15. If the Foncha government had done that in April 1961, they would have
> been totally justified and they could have demanded for a separate
> independence. The UN and the Administering Authority would have had no
> choice but to give them full support by postponing the termination of the
> trusteeship agreement over the Southern Cameroons. The Nigerian and
> British governments had voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 1608, clearing the
> way for integrating Northern Cameroons into Nigeria on 1st June 1961.
> Unfortunately the Foncha government failed to see this opportunity and it
> was lost for good.
> 16. When the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 1608 in spite of
> Ahidjo's NO vote, President Ahidjo changed tactics by making preparation for
> the Foumban Conference because the resolution required that the Cameroun
> Republic and the Southern Cameroon should agree by 1st October 1961 on how
> they were going to implement their "agreed policies". Their agreed policies
> were contained in the Joint Communique of 14.10.1960.
> 17. President Ahidjo prepared a draft Federal Constitution and sent it to
> the Southern Cameroons Commissioner's office in June 1961. The review of
> the draft showed that Ahidjo wanted to take over security from the states;
> he wanted to send security forces into Southern Cameroons and he wanted
> Foncha to hand over sovereignty to him. The Ahidjo who was wooed by Foncha
> in 1960 was now pushing to take over completely.
> 18. The Foumban Conference was held in July 1961 and the purpose was to
> discuss and agree on the draft federal constitution which Ahidjo had sent to
> Commissioner JO Field in June 1961. Many people have state that its purpose
> was to prepare a union agreement. This is simply not true because President
> Ahidjo prepared the draft federal constitution based on the Joint Communique
> of 14.10.1960.
> 19. The Foumban Conference of July 1961 was the only occasion where the
> opposition provided any input into the draft constitution because even after
> receiving the draft constitution from President Ahidjo, the KNDP government
> refused to share it with the CPNC opposition. At this stage it was too late
> because they were considered sore losers. After the Foumban Conference,
> President Ahidjo cut secret deals with Foncha and Muna by promising them
> positions in an expanded government and that is how the federal constitution
> was finalized after the Foumban Conference.
> 20.The Federal Constitution was tabled for adoption before the Southern
> Cameroons House of Assembly on 18.9.1961 under a motion by Honorable ST
> Muna, the Finance Minister. The motion was seconded by Motomby-Woleta, the
> Opposition spokesman.
> 21. After an eloquent speech in which he reiterated his belief that the
> people had made the wrong choice, he conceded, nevertheless, that the
> people's choice must be supported in a democracy. That is how the Federal
> Constitution was adopted by the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly.
> 22.The adoption of the draft federal constitution by the Southern Cameroons
> House of Assembly on 18.9.61 marked the completion point of the
> implementation of UNGA Resolution 1608 (XV). The commonly held view that
> the UN resolution was not implemented is not supported by documentary
> evidence.
> 23. On 30th September 1961 at midnight, Commissioner JO Field and the
> British Battalion left Southern Cameroons; the security forces of the
> Cameroun Republic moved into the Southern Cameroons.
> 24. What are the implications under international law, of the fact that the
> Southern Cameroons House of Assembly adopted the draft Federal Constitution
> on 18.9.1961, clearing the way to the coming into effect of the Federal
> Republic of Cameroon and its constituent parts and organs from 1st October
> 1961? The first implication is that the Southern Cameroons House of
> Assembly had accepted that as from 1st October 1961, the Federal
> Constitution would become the supreme governing law over the combined
> territory of the British Southern Cameroons and Cameroun Republic, which
> thereafter, would be known as the Federal Republic of Cameroon. The second
> implication is
> that the Federal Constitution, which was unanimously adopted by the
> Southern Cameroons House of Assembly, is indeed the legal document, binding
> the Cameroun Republic with the British Southern Cameroons.
> 25. It is the adoption of the federal constitution by the Southern
> Cameroons House of Assembly on 18.9.61 that automatically transferred
> sovereign powers over the Federal territory to President Ahidjo as from
> midnight on 30th September 1961 at midnight. Ahidjo, acting as
> Commander-in-Chief of the Cameroonian Armed Forces, had full powers to send
> the army into Bamenda, Kumba and Buea where a vacuum was created by the
> departure of the British Army Battalion.
> 26. As frustrations have grown over the years in the former
> British Southern Cameroons over feelings of second-class citizenship,
> over-centralization of power in Yaoundé, inadequate representation in
> government and structures of power, tokenism in official appointments, the
> unresponsiveness of the government in Yaoundé to many unresolved issues,
> there are temptations in the former British Southern Cameroons to accuse
> specific individuals for betraying them. It would be dangerous to single out
> specific individuals to assign exclusive blame to. Nevertheless specific
> instances of costly mistakes which brought about this situation need to be
> cited.
> a. Southern Cameroonian leaders including Foncha, Mbile and Ntumazah
> sold the Southern Cameroons short at the 4th Committee of UN in October 959
> when they all said that Southern Cameroons cannot stand on its own. Their
> self-proclaimed doubts to some extent, betrayed the Southern Cameroons.
> They sounded like people who still needed spoon-feeding and babysitting.
> Guinea and Afghanistan who were also members of the UNGA 4th Committee said
> that economic viability did not matter on questions of sovereignty and
> independence.
> b. Dr. Endeley sulked for too long after losing his Premiership to
> Foncha in 1959. He turned his back on Foncha and left the inexperienced
> KNDP government alone to handle the tricky negotiations with Ahidjo. He
> could have tabled a motion in the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly
> demanding that the draft Federal Constitution sent by Ahidjo be opened to
> debate by the full house before going for negotiations in Foumban. But he
> did not. He could have stormed into the office of JO Field and demanded to
> see what was being negotiated behind the backs of the opposition. But he
> did not. Instead he insisted on the
> 2nd option of joining Cameroun Republic hoping that it will frighten people
> to vote in favor of Nigeria. Instead he drove Foncha into the arms of
> Ahidjo.
> c. J O Field failed the people of the Southern Cameroons by allowing
> the Foncha government to hold three negotiating sessions with a foreign
> government (the Cameroun Republic) without the presence of a representative
> of the Administering Authority. This was a violation of the spirit of the
> Trusteeship Agreement of 1946. He failed to take any corrective action when
> Foncha came back from Yaoundé on 14 October 1960 with a signed treaty. It
> was the responsibility of the Administering Authority to hold final
> negotiations with the Cameroun
> Republic (like the UK did with China on behalf of Hong Kong). But J O
> Field failed in his job and did not even show up in Foumban as required by
> Resolution 1608 (XV). This was a further violation of the spirit of the
> Trusteeship Agreement. In a nutshell the United Kingdom abandoned its
> custodial responsibilities when it was needed the most.
> d. Accusations have been made over the years against Foncha and Muna
> for betraying the people of the Southern Cameroons. However, an objective
> review of documents and the events leading up to the reunification shows
> that Foncha, Muna, Jua, Effiom and Kemcha can be charged with political
> naivety and incompetence due to lack of experience in their handling of key
> policies which were clearly beyond their depth; but the charge of betrayal
> does not stand up to scrutiny. Foncha, Muna and their KNDP allies were
> pro-independence by conviction. They had no
> desire for joining Cameroun Republic. It is Dr. Endeley who pushed them
> into the arms of Ahidjo by forcing the 2nd option of joining Cameroun
> Republic. They were however naïve when they went ahead and signed the
> Yaoundé Agreement of 14th October 1960 without consulting with the
> administering authority or with opposition parties.
> e. Foncha could have initialed a draft agreement with Charles Assale
> (excluding Ahidjo) and brought it back to the Commissioner in Buea for
> further review. It is the Commissioner who would have taken it up with the
> Colonial Office in London to see how a more elaborate document could be
> crafted to represent the final agreed framework for unification if the 2nd
> option prevails. If they had handled the Yaoundé agreement in this manner,
> H.M Government would have negotiated a document which would have better
> protected the people of the Southern Cameroons, in the same way that Hong
> Kong agreement with China protects Hong Kong
> today. Their decision to sign the document in Yaoundé without consulting
> anyone in Buea was an act of political naivety and incompetence not
> betrayal.
> f. However, after receiving the draft federal constitution in June
> 1960, it is clear that Foncha and Muna were clearly influenced by the
> Federal positions promised to them by Ahidjo. This seems to have had a
> strong influence on their behavior before, during and after the Foumban
> Conference. Jua's opposition to reunification may have been softened by the
> promise that he will become Prime Minister of West Cameroon after Foncha
> takes up the position of VP in Yaoundé. But in the end, Foncha kept the
> post of Prime Minister of West Cameroon after accepting the position of VP
> of the Federal Republic.
> Muna on the other hand accepted the position of Federal Minister of Post
> and Telecommunications on October 1st 1961 and his political career never
> took a dip till he retired from politics as President of the National
> Assembly.
> g. The Foncha government failed to react when the Ahidjo Government
> voted against UNGA Resolution 1608 (XV) at the United Nations. Foncha could
> have immediately repudiated the Yaoundé Agreement and filed for full
> independence. Did Foncha's government analyze the implications of President
> Ahidjo's decision to vote against the UN resolution on reunification? This
> is a question that will never be answered.
> 27. Finally it would be incomplete to prepare a document of this nature
> without shedding some light on the role of President Ahidjo in the entire
> reunification process. Was he the Machiavellian villain that he is
> sometimes portrayed to be?
> 28. Documentary evidence seems to suggest that the constant preoccupation
> in the mind of President Ahidjo throughout the whole process was the threat
> of "communist terrorists" (marquisards) and the survival of his regime.
> Felix-Rolland Moumié had succeeded Reuben Um Nyobe as UPC leader after he
> was killed in 1958 in Sanaga Maritime. Having been previously implanted in
> Bassa country, the UPC marquis took for the mountains of Bamilike country
> and formed the Army for the Liberation of Kamerun (ALNK) under the command
> of Martin Singap.
> 29. The following events took place during the reunification process:
> a. The British Ambassador to Yaoundé indicated that Foncha and Moumié
> had met in Accra in early1960 and that Foncha was trying to convince Ahidjo
> to allow Moumié to return to Cameroun. Ahidjo was firmly opposed to this
> idea. This must have given Ahidjo some concern about the wisdom of coming
> too close to Foncha.
> b. Dr. Moumié was poisoned in Geneva by French intelligence on 16th
> October 1960, two days following the signing of the Yaoundé Agreement. It
> is fair to assume that when Foncha and Ahidjo were meeting in Yaoundé,
> Ahidjo was already informed that French intelligence was planning to
> assassinate Moumié. He died in hospital on 3rd November 1960.
> c. Ahidjo was aware of the fact that One Kamerun Party (OK) was a
> legally constituted party in the Southern Cameroons headed by Ndeh Ntumazah
> (a Mankon, Bamenda Man) and that OKP was a mirror of the UPC headed by
> Moumié the sworn enemy of Ahidjo. With Foncha (a Nkwen, Bamenda Man) who
> had been too friendly with Moumié (a Bamoum Man) and Endeley (a Bakweri Man)
> who was turning towards Nigeria, and the UN having forced Resolution 1608
> (XV) down his throat, Ahidjo did not know who to count on as his friends.
> His regime was in deep trouble. He turned towards France and decided to
> play the anti-communist card to the
> fullest.
> d. His French political advisers (Jacques Foccart) told him that in
> order to protect his regime, he must move military and security forces into
> Southern Cameroons at the same time that the British Protection Force is
> being withdrawn from the Southern Cameroons. Failure to do so would result
> in the ANLK, under the command of Martin Singap, moving their communist
> terrorists into Southern Cameroons where a vacuum would be created on the
> withdrawal of the British Protection Force. (Note that if this had happened,
> the counterinsurgency operation which President Ahidjo conducted in
> Bamilikeland between 1962-1966, with an armored brigade of the French Army
> under General Max Briand and Col Jean Lamberton, armed
> and supplied by Jacques Foccart, would have taken place in the West
> Cameroon)
> e. Having secured Ahidjo's agreement, French Commanders started
> planning with the Commander of the 1st Battalion of the Grenadier Guards on
> careful arrangement for the handover of their duties in Southern Cameroons
> to at least an equal number of troops from the Cameroun Republic, as they
> pull out on 30th September 1961. It is reported in a confidential document
> (COSS4/2188 X63970) dated November 1961 prepared by the Cabinet Colonial
> Policy Committee on the Southern Cameroons that "the handover went in fact
> very smoothly. The Guards were withdrawn at the beginning of October and
> there have been no
> reports of any serious incidents since then"
> f. The main reason why the British government arranged the handover
> to forces from Cameroun Republic is that HM Government decided to make a
> "parting gift" of £500,000, subsequently increased to £575,000 to the
> Southern Cameroons to pay the salaries of British officials staying beyond
> 1st October 1961. These British officials needed protection.
> g. The above clarification is necessary in order to enable all
> Cameroonians to understand how and why security and armed forces of Cameroun
> Republic moved into the Southern Cameroons on reunification day. It is
> quite clear that President Ahidjo never negotiated in bad faith with Foncha
> and the Southern Cameroonians. He did not have any Machiavellian designs or
> agenda over the Southern Cameroons beyond the preoccupation to implement an
> unwanted and unsolicited UN resolution without jeopardizing the security of
> his regime.
>
>
> 30. In the light of all of the above, was the reunification of 1st October
> 1961 a legally valid sovereign merger under international law? Did the
> Federal Republic of Cameroon which came into being on 1st October 1961 meet
> all the conditions for being considered a properly constituted sovereign
> entity under international law? Was UNGA Resolution 1608 (XV) completely
> and satisfactorily implemented? The answer to all these questions, in my
> view, is YES because the process which I have examined does not contain any
> legal deficiencies or imperfections, under international law, which will
> lead me to question the constitutional validity of the sovereign
> entity which came into being on 1st October 1961 known as 'The Federal
> Republic of Cameroon".
> 31. In a nutshell, legal reunification did take place on 1st October 1961.
>
>
> © Copyright July 2011, Nfor N. Susungi
>
>
>
>
>
>
> --- On Fri, 6/29/12, Akoson Raymond <akosonako@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
>
> From: Akoson Raymond <akosonako@yahoo.com>
> Subject: [cameroon_politics] REUNIFICATION: CLARIFICATION NOTE
> To: "camnetwork@yahoogroups.com" <camnetwork@yahoogroups.com>,
> "cameroon_politics@yahoogroups.com" <cameroon_politics@yahoogroups.com>,
> "cameroons_sdf_party@yahoogroups.com" <cameroons_sdf_party@yahoogroups.com>,
> "cameroonfinland@yahoogroups.com" <cameroonfinland@yahoogroups.com>,
> "ambasbay@googlegroups.com" <ambasbay@googlegroups.com>, "standardtribune"
> <standardtribune@ymail.com>, "thepostnp" <thepostnp@yahoo.com>,
> "thestarheadlines" <thestarheadlines@yahoo.com>, "eugenendindi"
> <eugenendindi@yahoo.com>, "eugene.nforngwa"
> <eugene.nforngwa@standardtribune.com>, "epiendengu@yahoo.com"
> <epiendengu@yahoo.com>, "edenmedia" <edenmedia@yahoo.co.uk>,
> "recorderspecial@gmail.com" <recorderspecial@gmail.com>
> Date: Friday, June 29, 2012, 3:19 AM
>
>
>
>
>
>
> REUNIFICATION: CLARIFICATION
>
>
>
> BY AYAH Paul ABINE
>
> Sometime in 2009, the Cameroun's Minister of Communication and Government's
> spokesman granted an interview in which he said the only documents in the
> Secretariat General of the United Nations on the independence of Cameroun
> were the ones relative to the indpendence of January 1, 1961. In his
> end-of-year address to the nation on December 31, 2009, the President of the
> Republic confirmed this in almost identical terms.
>
> That led to Ayah Paul Abine writing the widely read article that the
> Government of Cameroun had "agreed with SCNC". The article was published by
> Eden newspaper, and the paper sold out. It would appear
> that the sales even necessitated a second impression of the paper. I have
> maintained my position publicly since then that there is no document on the
> any legal reunification in several write-ups, radio
> interviews, and television interviews. The Government of Cameroun is still
> to challenge, let alone, contradict me by brandishing any such
> document; or even merely referring to its existence. It is a fact too
> tangible to be controvertible that the United Nations prescribed tripartite
> talks between Southern Cameroons, the Republic of Camroun and the Kingdom of
> Great Britain between February and September 30, 1961, to set out the terms
> of the federation between
> Southern Cameroons and the Republic of Cameroun; methinks, under the
> auspices of the United Nations. The tripartite meeting never held and has
> never held. It is the documents evidencing the terms of the
> federation that had to be deposited with the Secretariat General of the
> United Nations. No such document exists! How does anyone deposit something
> tangible that does not exist?
>
> Suggesting that in its celebrated corruption, Cameroun may have influenced
> the Secretariat General of the
> United Nations to accept some fictitious documents is dishonourable for the
> world body; for then we are equating the august international body to
> corrupt Cameroun. I would be extremely reluctant even just to apply my mind
> to
> such possibility! The way forward then is for Southern Cameroons to sit at
> the table with the Republic of Cameroun under the auspices of the United
> Nations and agree or disagree on the possibility federating. That is all
> the
> more probable because time has not given proof to the flimsy argument then
> that Southern Cameroons was not viable enough economically to stand on its
> own feet. Nor does the fact that there were not enough educated Southern
> Cameroonians hold sway today.
>
> Anyone inimical to this peaceful way forward will take responsibility should
> Southern Cameroonians today or tomorrow abandon the peaceful option. That
> message should not be whittled down by pessimism much
> less betrayal against thirty pieces of
> silver!
>
> --
> The National Strategic Team,
> People's Action Party, PAP
> National Working Secretariat,
> Buea, South West Region,
> Cameroon.
>
> SLOGAN: A New People A New Cameroon
>
> *Tel:* (00237) 78 35 80 29 / 94 99 87 43
>
> *E-mail: presidentayah@gmail.com
> *Official Website: www.paprc2011.com OR www.ayahpaul.net
>
> *Facebook Page: *www.facebook.com/#!/profile.php?id=100001912645245
>
> --------------
> "I profoundly believe all Cameroonians will some day speak the same
> language, sing the same songs, dance to the same rhythm, dine and wine at
> the same table. When
> the rich shall cater for the poor and the strong shall
> help the weak, the law shall be supreme, justice and peace shall forever
> reign, if we are honest and believe we can get there. God bless
> Cameroon."Hon. Paul AYAH Abine, Cameroon 2011 Presidential aspirant
> ------------------------------
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> Website: http://www.dibussi.com
> Twitter: http://twitter.com/dibussi
> Slideshare: http://www.slideshare.net/dibussi
> Facebook: http://www.facebook.com/scribblesden
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