Professor Carlson Anyangwe's Interview with Abakwa Times: Answering the Francophone Revisionists: PDF

Ladies and gentlemen,
Those of us who did not read this before will surely find Professor
Carlson Anyangwe's interview with Abakwa Times as posted herein most
educative and deep.
Please read and re-read.
I do intend to use this interview in the coming days to educate
detractors like one Emmanuel Konde, Victor Julius Ngoh and many others
who are plain revisionists.
MOD

INTERVIEW WITH ABAKWATIMES IN 2012

Abakwatimes: Prof., you have been described as an astute, cold but
resilient figure, a person very much admired and respected for his
stance and tenacity; the conscience of the people of the Southern
Cameroons yet a reluctant General unwilling to step forward and assume
a more proactive and visible role of leadership in the Southern
Cameroons struggle. Is this a very much simplistic claim to something
more complex about you?
Answer: That is an involved question. If by that it is meant that I am
lacking in enthusiasm it is not true. What is seen as lack of
enthusiasm is actually deliberation. The second limb of your question
is a caricature. It is a simplistic characterization. Quite early, I
became aware of our political, economic, social, and cultural
predicament. That got me involved in the thick of things with various
Southern Cameroons struggle formations and leaderships. We are at the
verge of becoming extinct as a people. Our Homeland is at the
threshold of being completely defaced. I looked at our uncommon
situation. I sought to understand why this wretched lot befell us. I
sought to know whether God peculiarly created us for perdition as our
earthly destiny. I came to understand our human condition and the
nature and character of our people. So quite early, I resolved not
only to engage in the Struggle but also to be a peacemaker and a
consensus builder.
I decided to be a peacemaker and a consensus builder in the interest
of the Struggle. Being a peacemaker in the Southern Cameroons Struggle
requires that I contribute to the advantage of my fellow citizens of
the Southern Cameroons. I abhor anything, any conduct, any posturing,
any utterances, and any attitude tending to derail or constrain the
Struggle. I am naturally not content with our present collective lot,
including, by extension, the future lot of our progeny. If we take no
remedial action now to change the negative destiny and the looming
calamity staring us in the face we would be lost and our children will
be lost. I seek no glory. I am content with what I am. I am content
with what I have, be it so paltry.
I am ready to serve. But I will readily decline to do so if that would
promote divisiveness, if that would be the source of acrimony rather
than the source of a sense of purpose. I would readily decline to do
so if that would promote bickering rather than the common good. In
such circumstances I would rather defer to someone else. I prefer to
be a consensus choice. I am for cultivating and sustaining our spirit
of togetherness. This to me is critical for securing our collective
freedom from colonial serfdom. So to be a peacemaker is an active
virtue. It has never meant that I detach myself from the Struggle to
ponder over peace in some monastery. I make every effort to advance
the Struggle. At the same time, attitudinally and by word and conduct,
I work actively and positively towards peace.
Abakwatimes: You have written and published many articles and books
about the Southern Cameroons. Can you explain to anybody unaware of
this situation what the Southern Cameroons problem is all about?
Answer: This country was placed by Britain under the international
tutelage system. From 1922 until the demise of the League of Nations
it was a mandated territory under the League. Then from 1946 to 1961
it was a United Nations trust territory. The ultimate objective of the
trusteeship system was to lead the inhabitants of trust territories to
"self-government or independence." The UN-mandated plebiscite in the
Southern Cameroons held out the promise that the territory would
"achieve independence" consistently with Article 76 b of the Charter
of the United Nations. The plebiscite vote was above all a vote to
achieve independence, a process dictated by the Charter principle of
the right of self-determination. That principle informed and formed
the basis of the United Nations decolonization agenda. United Nations
General Assembly Resolution 1608 (XV) of 21 April 1961 took care to
state upfront that the UN "endorsed the result of the plebiscite that
… the people of the Southern Cameroons have decided to achieve
independence." After endorsing the decision of the people of the
Southern Cameroons to achieve independence, the United Nations then
proceeded in the same Resolution to decide that its trusteeship over
the territory would be terminated "in accordance with Article 76 b of
the Charter of the United Nations … on 1 October 1961 upon [the
Southern Cameroons] joining the Republic of Cameroun." Notice the
sequence of the matters dealt with in the resolution: the plebiscite
was basically a vote to achieve independence; the independence
decision was endorsed by the UN; the UN then made two decisions (i)
termination of the trusteeship, it being satisfied that the provisions
of Article 76 b of the UN Charter had been met, meaning the Southern
Cameroons had politically advanced to the level of 'self-government or
independence', (ii) 1 October 1961 set as the date of ending of the
trusteeship entailing automatic independence for the Southern
Cameroons and then its 'joining' Cameroun Republic on that same date;
'joining' was legally infeasible in the absence of concomitant
achievement of independence and termination of trusteeship.
What all this means is that there was a vote to achieve independence
and the vote was endorsed by the UN. But a vote to achieve
independence and even when endorsed by the UN does not mean
independence was actually achieved. That is the first point we make on
this subject. Arguably, the termination of trusteeship on 1 October
1961 ipso facto meant independence was indeed achieved. But that is
not borne out by the evidence of what transpired. Well before that
date Cameroun Republic purported to exercise acts of sovereignty over
the territory such as by moving its troops into it and passing an
annexation law laying claim to the Southern Cameroons as part of its
national territory returned to it. The British themselves confessed
that they transferred the Southern Cameroons to Cameroun Republic. A
colonial territory does not achieve independence by being annexed by
or transferred to another country. That is the second point we make.
In sum, we are saying while the Southern Cameroons voted for
independence, independence was in fact never achieved as Cameroun
Republic simply annexed the territory and thereby frustrated and
suppressed the achievement of independence set for 1 October 1961.
This contention is further supported by the fact that there is no
evidence that the Southern Cameroons ever achieved independence. The
territory, cut into two and linked to bordering regions of Cameroun
Republic, is under the rule and occupation of that country. There is
no government in Buea as ought to have been the case. Politically,
economically, socially, and culturally we are a dependent people under
Cameroun Republic colonial rule just as we were under British colonial
rule.
The Southern Cameroons problem then is essentially a sovereignty
question, a question of legal title to territory, a decolonization
problem. It is a case of colonial occupation and spoliation by a
contiguous state. It is a case of black-on-black colonization. I have
articulated this particularly in my Imperialistic Politics in Cameroun
(2008), Betrayal of Too Trusting a People (2009), and Secrets of an
Aborted Decolonisation (2010).
For the avoidance of doubt let us step a little back into history.
Before the Act of the 1885 Berlin African Conference came up with the
concept of 'effective occupation', the international law and practice
of territorial acquisition at the time was that when a colonial power
claimed a coastal strip the area beyond that strip also fell to the
colonial power by virtue of the 'hinterland theory'. Way back in 1844
Britain started concluding treaties with coastal chiefs from Bimbia to
Bakassi (Ambose or Ambas Bay). In 1858 the missionary settlement of
Victoria was founded by certain British subjects and subsequently
taken over by Britain as an integral part of Her Majesty's dominions.
With the British assumption of sovereignty over Victoria the coastal
environ from Bimbia to Bakassi also became British and the hinterland
of that coastal strip automatically became a British sphere of
influence. It remained so until 1887 when it was transferred to
Germany. That area corresponded roughly to the territory that later
became the British Southern Cameroons. It was not part of the original
Duala mud flat estuarine enclave claimed in 1884 by Germany as
Kamerun. Victoria and the surrounding area were transferred to Germany
in 1887 but because of the emergent concept of effective occupation
Germany could claim only such territory as it could effectively
occupy. Tedious military campaigns and exploration expeditions were
undertaken inland to Saxonhoff (Buea), Kumba (Albretch…), Ossidinge
(Mamfe), Baliburg (Bali) and Bande (Mankon) during a period lasting
from about 1889 to about 1902.
The whole of that area was retaken by Britain in August 1914 at the
very beginning of World War I. The frontier between the British
Cameroons and French Cameroun was then determined and demarcated by
Britain and France and confirmed by the League of Nations and later
the United Nations. The frontier between the Southern Cameroons and
Republic of Cameroun was thus not determined and delimited by these
two countries or either of them. The Southern Cameroons' effective
connection with Kamerun thus lasted less than two decades and was
politically void. This compares most unfavourably with the 75 years of
intense British connection (1858-1887, 1915-1961) and 38 years of
equally intense Nigerian connection (1922-1960). The Southern
Cameroons was self-governing from 1954 to 1961 though under British
colonial rule and from 1962-1972 though under Cameroun Republic
colonial rule.
Since 1972 the Southern Cameroons no longer has self-rule. There is no
longer a government in Buea for the governance of the Southern
Cameroons. There is no longer Parliament (House of Assembly and House
of Chiefs) in Buea to make laws for the peace order and good
government of the Southern Cameroons. There is no longer a Southern
Cameroons-based judiciary to administer justice according to the
common law inherited system of the Southern Cameroons and to ensure
respect for the rule of law. There is no longer a Southern
Cameroons-based public service commission and system of
administration. There is no longer a Southern Cameroons-based
constabulary to enforce and maintain law and order according to our
inherited value systems and human rights culture. There is no longer a
Southern Cameroons-based educational system grounded in good and sound
education and upbringing of our children anchored in the value of our
Christian faith and the wider context of the English-speaking world of
which we are an integral part. There is no longer a Southern
Cameroons-based medical system anchored in effective medical service
for all (including the poor and vulnerable) staffed by devoted,
professional and disciplined uniformed nurses, doctors, pharmacists
and ward servants. Our living habitat was surveyed, planned and zoned:
town centre, markets and a park next to each, GRC, Clerks Quarters,
Nurses Quarters, housing for doctors and pharmacists, police barracks,
warders' barracks and so on. All that is gone! Destroyed! Today
sprawling shanty towns are mushrooming everywhere.
A system, corrupt and counterfeit in every respect, has been foisted
on us. An alien system and culture has been imposed upon us. A
colonial extractive and exploitative economic system now obtains. Our
entire existence is controlled and manipulated. It is controlled and
manipulated from outside our Homeland. Even our traditional rulers now
owe their chieftaincy stools to Cameroun Republic. They are locally
manipulated and controlled by some 'sous-prefet' or 'prefet' ignorant
of our traditions and customs but to whom our traditional rulers are
constrained to pay fealty under pain of being 'unrecognized'. Even our
basic education teachers owe their teaching appointments from Cameroun
Republic. The colonizing state seeks to destroy our autonomous
identity as a people. It seeks to cow us, to crush our individual and
collective spirit and to put fear in our hearts so that our human
personality deteriorates and our dignity, self-worth and self-reliance
disappear. We are liable at any time to be arbitrarily arrested and
imprisoned and tortured. Our homes, persons and possessions are
subject at any hour to unheralded search and seizure. All this
exemplifies the mark of every colonial arbitrary government and
differentiates a constitutional democracy from an autocracy.
Not one hired minister, legislator, judicial officer, or civil servant
from our Homeland has standing to challenge this debilitating,
disabling and humiliating dispensation. Like all of us, and contrary
to what they may have thought, not one of these individuals hired from
our homeland is safe from torment and injury by Cameroun Republic.
Recent happenings provide ample corroboration. Today, in 2012, it is a
fact that our lot under British colonial rule was a thousand times
better than our present situation. At least the British gave us a
measure of self-government and we felt able to manage our own affairs
except for foreign affairs and defence which constituted the reserved
domain of the British colonial power. Today, we have been taken more
than a hundred years backwards in every sphere of human endeavour. How
can any rational people, any people with self-worth and dignity,
possibly accept this kind of wretched condition? None! And that is why
the people of the Southern Cameroons have not, will not and will never
accept it even in a thousand years. We demand what is rightfully ours
by justice, by law and by the law of nature. We ask simply to be left
alone!!!
No citizen of the Southern Cameroons, irrespective of what position
they are hired to by the colonizing power, can ever speak
authoritatively about the Camerounese system. No native of the
Southern Cameroons can freely and with dignity assert or claim a right
or a privilege in Cameroun Republic. Every single native of the
Southern Cameroons, child or adult, experiences themselves as an
alien. They are conscious that they are so regarded and so treated. It
is so irrespective of whatever position they find themselves in or
have been co-opted into. They remain outsiders. There are firm no-go
areas for them. The Camerounese citizenship foisted on them is a fake.
It is without content. It is meaningless to all intents and purposes.
Every native of the Southern Cameroons is legally required to have
with them at all times a piece of document denoted as 'carte
d'identité'. The document serves not only to identify its bearer.
Because of the very intrusive particulars in that document, it also
serves, above all, extortionist, labelling and discriminatory agendas.
Citizens of the Southern Cameroons may carry a Camerounese passport.
But they know deep down in their hearts that the document has little
meaning. The document serves for the time being as a travel document
of convenience, like a foreign ship flying a flag of convenience. The
reason for obtaining the document is that even as persons from a
dependent territory they are entitled under international law to have
a travel document to enable them to exercise the fundamental human
right of freedom of movement.
Abakwatimes: In 1993 and 1994, you, Dr. Simon Munzu, Barrister
Ekontang Elad and, to a limited extent, Benjamin Itoe, convened
"Anglophones" to an All Anglophone Conference. What was the motivation
for this very public challenge to what Republic of Cameroun calls its
'unity'?
Answer: Look, misrule and other violence have always afflicted that
country right from the start of French colonial rule and quite early
we helped by granting asylum to thousands of refugees from there.
Today, gross maladministration and other serious governance deficit
have exacerbated tribal factionalism, schism and systemic corruption
in that country and the state itself has become bandit. Those are
internal matters of that country. They certainly put into doubt the
question of a common citizenship for natives of that country. But that
is a matter for the people of that country to sort out, one way or the
other. We, citizens of the Southern Cameroons, have never challenged,
and have no intention to challenge, the unity of Cameroun Republic.
What we challenge, and rightly so, is the annexation of the Southern
Cameroons by that country. We shall continue to challenge that
annexation until Cameroun Republic becomes a credible law-abiding
member of the international community by renouncing its colonial
pursuit and leaving us alone to manage our own affairs and control our
own destiny.
You will probably recall that my colleagues and I were part of a
Constitutional Drafting Committee set up by the Yaoundé Tripartite
Meeting to write a constitution. The meeting was called 'Tripartite'
because it was a gathering of three constituencies: political parties,
so-called 'civil society' and 'independent personalities'. It was a
poor and unstructured substitute for the 'sovereign national
conference' which opposition political parties were calling for at the
time and in furtherance of which they had pressed into service the
deadly civil disobedience protest action known locally as 'ghost
towns'. All Southern Cameroons leaders at the Meeting made speeches to
the effect that the occasion was an opportunity to correct past ills
in the political association of the two Cameroons and to put that
political association on a mutually acceptable foundation. Cameroun
Republic leaders were of course determined to make the Tripartite a
mere talking shop and something of a circus or a jamboree.
The Committee was mandated to draft a constitution. But it was not
apparent the entity for which the constitution was meant. From the
onset therefore we tabled this question for determination. We were
alive to the fact that citizens of Cameroun Republic constituted the
majority on our Committee and that whatever contribution we made would
run the gauntlet of cultural and hegemonic prejudice. But since we
were all lawyers we thought we could have a full debate on this
particular issue and arrive at some acceptable accommodation. Our
'friends' were nonplussed by the fact that we should even have raised
that question. For them it was self-evident that our brief was to
draft a constitution for Republic of Cameroun. We told them that that
was not our understanding of our remit, especially in the light of the
various statements made by all Southern Cameroons leaders at the
Meeting and the complete unacceptability by the people of the Southern
Cameroons of the 1972 gigantic fraud and historical swindle that
passed for a 'referendum'. We reminded them that in 1984 Cameron
Republic reasserted its separate identity as a distinct political
expression. We also reminded them that there are two Cameroons: the
Southern Cameroons and Republic of Cameroun. Each of these countries
was a former Class B Trust Territory of the United Nations under a
distinct and separate administering authority. Each country followed
its own distinct pathway and Cameroun Republic achieved its
independence on 1 January 1960. We argued that if there was still a
desire for political association between the two countries that
political association had to be put on clear and sound foundations. We
stated that it was important to do away with the horse and rider
relationship existing between the two countries since October 1961.
The Committee's chairman, a citizen of Cameroun Republic, brushed
aside our submission and ruled that we had to proceed with drafting a
constitution for Republic of Cameroun. We replied that while we were
willing to assist them as consultants draft a constitution for
Republic of Cameroun we were opposed to the Southern Cameroons being
considered part of Republic of Cameroun. We told him that in our view
it was critical to go back to the federalism that was agreed upon by
the two countries as the condition sine qua non of political
association. His reply was that federalism was tantamount to
secession. At that moment, we knew we were dealing with persons who
were impervious to reason. We then served notice of our intention to
discontinue our participation in the Commission. But before we left we
told them they had better accept the federalism we were offering. We
said we were making the offer at our own risk because, given the long
and bitter suffering of our people at the hands of Cameroun Republic,
we were not sure they will even accept a federal arrangement with
Republic of Cameroun. We then left and later tendered our resignation
from the Committee giving reasons for our action.
We then decided to convene AAC1 for the following reasons: (i) in
order to report to our people what transpired at the Commission
because without such a report they would not know why we resigned from
the Committee and would be fed with the Government's propagandistic
version of our action; (ii) in to enable our people to pronounce
themselves clearly on their future given the sustained propaganda by
Cameroun Republic that the plebiscite vote was a vote for so-called
'reunification' and not for independence; and (iii) for our people to
give us clear directions as to the way forward from that moment.
As you would recall, at AAC1 our people gave us thumbs up for
insisting on a return to the federation of two states, equal in status
as that was the common understanding of the meaning of the second
plebiscite question. Conference then directed that we keep the federal
offer open in the hope that Republic of Cameroun would buy into it. It
mandated us to draft a federal constitution and to submit it to the
President and Prime Minister of Republic of Cameroun. AAC2 would hold
in a years' time and it would, amongst other things, consider the
status of the federal offer to Cameroun Republic. We drafted the
federal constitution as AAC1 mandated us to do. We submitted it to the
Camerounese President who did not even have the decency to acknowledge
receipt of it. We also submitted a copy to the Prime Minister of that
country at the time. The chairman of the Committee later appeared on
television and in a display of ignorance and of Cameroun Republic's
well-known Nigeria-phobia peremptorily dismissed our draft federal
constitution as the Nigerian constitution. But that did not vex us in
the least and it did not deflect us.
Cameroun Republic's active non-cooperation was fully discussed at
AAC2. An all-important decision was taken and reflected in the
document that was unanimously adopted at the end of Conference. That
document, the Bamenda Proclamation, commanded that should Cameroun
Republic "either persist in its refusal to engage in meaningful
constitutional talks or fails to engage in such talks with the
Southern Cameroons within a reasonable time" the Southern Cameroons
National Council "shall so inform the people of the Southern Cameroons
by all suitable means and shall thereupon proclaim the revival of the
independence and sovereignty of the territory of the Southern
Cameroons and take all measures necessary to secure, defend and
preserve the independence, sovereignty and integrity of the said
Territory." This was the declared and published policy statement
adopted at AAC2. This pathway was indicated almost two decades ago.
The challenge since then has been for the people of the Southern
Cameroons to implement AAC2.
In those years Sam was chair, Simon spokesperson and I secretary
general. You might be intrigued to know that we see each other from
time to time. While at the Committee in Yaoundé we caucused every
single night and strategized with a close-knit group of our people
from various callings whose identity must for the time being remain
anonymous. We adopted the same fruitful strategy at Buea and Bamenda
and after each Conference held inclusive meetings with large sections
of our people, including our traditional leaders and men and women in
uniform. After Bamenda the 'Anglophone Council' was advisedly
transmuted into the Southern Cameroons National Council to indicate we
had crossed the Rubicon.
Abakwatimes: In the past few weeks, Dr. Susungi has openly questioned
a historical claim that the 'unification' between the State of
Cameroun and Southern Cameroons was not grounded in any treaty law. He
calls this assertion revisionist at best ad distortionist at worst and
has produced a series of documents to show the 'union' was actually
grounded in law. Why have you been very silent on this challenge to
your legacy? Is there any validity in what Dr. Susungi has been
writing?
Answer: When he talks of revisionism and distortion the boot, in fact,
is in the other leg. There is no validity whatsoever in his
assertions. He can repeat them a thousand times à la Goebbels if he
wants. But that will not change the stubborn fact that the Southern
Cameroons was annexed by Cameroun Republic and remains annexed to this
day. He may undertake a thousand fishing expeditions in search of an
imaginary treaty or some other phoney document. But he will find
nothing because none exists. It is a matter of some amusement that the
Southern Cameroons Sovereignty Question is the only matter concerning
which every Tom, Dick and Harry claims legal expertise.
That said, you are in fact inviting me to say quite a lot. I will not
dodge from doing so. In order to dispel a good many myths distilled
and propagated by some it is important I say the things I have to say
but which, as you have noted, I have been silent about. Some of the
things I will say would be new and may come to some people as a
surprise. The misinformation and disinformation by the person you
allude to relate mainly to the following matters: 'reunification', the
Foncha-Ahidjo joint communiqué, economic viability of the Southern
Cameroons, 'the Federal Constitution', annexation of the Southern
Cameroons, and the Foumban meeting in July 1961. I shall take these
matters one after the other.
1. Reunification. No talk on 'reunification' of territories is
meaningful unless there is clearly identified the territories that
were once unified, separated and then re-unified. Germany which was
unified by 1871 thanks to the labours of Bismarck, remained one
country until the defeat of Hitler in 1945 when it was split in 1949
into two states, the Federal Republic of Germany and the German
Democratic Republic. When the Berlin Wall came down in 1990 the two
countries agreed to reconstitute a single Germany, underpinned by a
treaty. The 1990 reconstitution of Germany was correctly presented as
'reunification'. The same would be true if the two states of North
Korea and South Korea were today to decide to reconstitute the single
independent state of Korea that was forcibly annexed in 1910 by Japan
as Chosun and which was split in 1948.
In the present case one cannot credibly talk of reunification of
Kamerun, the German colonial territory that lasted less than thirty
years. Five parts of that entity are now within the territory of five
limitrophic states: Nigeria, Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, Chad and
Central African Republic. Reunification or even unification of Kamerun
will require bringing together again all these various parts to form a
single state, inclusive of the Southern Cameroons and Cameroun
Republic. That has never been on the cards, is not and will never be.
One cannot even begin to talk of reunification or even unification of
Cameroun Republic. The existence of Cameroun Republic as a political
expression goes back to French Cameroun which emerged in 1922 as a
result of the political force represented by the mandates system. (It
is noteworthy that from 1916 when Germany was defeated in Kamerun
until the institution of the mandates system in 1922, France, still
licking the wounds of its crushing defeat in 1870 by Prussia, held the
Kamerun area under its occupation as enemy territory seized in war,
the enemy being of course Germany). At independence Cameroun Republic
inherited its territories from French Cameroun. The country has
suffered no dismemberment. There are therefore no separated parts
which are then being reconstituted. One cannot therefore speak of
unification or reunification of Cameroun Republic. The Southern
Cameroons was not part of French Cameroun, has never been and will
never be part of Cameroun Republic. The plebiscite vote on 11 February
1961 for independence, and political association with Cameroun
Republic in a federation of two states, equal in status cannot
therefore be presented as a vote for 'reunification' whether of
Cameroun Republic or of Kamerun, a name that has never had currency in
Cameroun Republic, and an entity long extinct. At the plebiscite on 11
February 1961 there was no such political status option available as
'reunification'. There could therefore have been no vote for an option
that was not available.
Politicians did sometimes use the term 'reunification'. But our
politicians are not known for always using apposite terminology.
Besides, the fact that the term was used does not make such use
legally, historically and etymologically correct. There has been no
such thing as 'reunification' of the Southern Cameroons and Republic
of Cameroun. Even at Foumban, the banner on display spoke of
'unification' and not of 'reunification'. Some argue that the terms
'reunification' and 'unification' mean one and the same thing in
Cameroon historiography. Historiography is writing about history
rather than of history, a meta-level analysis of descriptions of the
past. If that is the case writers of our history who persevere in the
use of unification and reunification as interchangeable terminologies
lay themselves open to a charge of poverty of thought and
conceptualization regarding the event they analyse. The truth of the
matter is that Republic of Cameroun's addictive use of 'reunification'
is meant to camouflage the fact of its colonial occupation of the
Southern Cameroons and to condition the people of the territory to
acquiesce in that colonialism. In the watery mouth of the slippery
rulers of Cameroun Republic 'reunification' has changing meaning
depending on time, place and audience. According to Cameroun Republic
officialdom, that country achieved 'independence' on 1 January 1960
and then 'reunification' on 1 October 1961. It then proceeded to
achieve 'total national unity' on 20 May 1972 and 'completion of total
national unity' on 4 February 1984. It valiantly moved on to achieve
'completion of complete national unity' following the promulgation of
the 1996 constitution, and 'the apotheosis of national unity' since
then. The voyage to Buea of the President of Cameroun Republic would
then be the 'super apotheosis of national unity'. This is an
impressive Alice-in-Wonderland gobbledegook! The appropriation of
'unification' or 'reunification' by Cameroun Republic is a
self-serving highly instrumental strategy. It has always been an
attempt by that country to legitimize its colonial occupation, rule
and exploitation in the Southern Cameroons. All Southern Cameroons
anti-colonial forces are determined to delegitimize that rhetoric and
narrative.
Southern Cameroons plus Cameroun Republic cannot be equal to Cameroun
Republic. That would be annexation, not reunification. Cameroun
Republic knows this only too well. So right from the beginning it
contrived to make its annexation and colonial occupation of the
Southern Cameroons somehow palatable to swallow. It uses reunification
as a polysemous expression to camouflage annexation. It has been aided
in this cheap language ploy by the polysemous name 'Cameroon'. There
cannot be reunification of two political entities resulting in the
existence of only one of the two reuniting entities. In other words,
to say that the Southern Cameroons + Cameroun Republic = Cameroun
Republic is a mathematical nonsense and is possible only if the
Southern Cameroons = zero, which is not and cannot be the case. The
equation: the Southern Cameroons + Cameroun Republic = Cameroun
Republic signifies in political terms that the Southern Cameroons has
been absorbed, annexed, colonized by Cameroun Republic. This is the
conclusion arrived at by every single serious writer whether jurist,
politician or social scientist who has applied their mind to the
Southern Cameroons tragedy.
2. Joint Communiqué. It is said by the person you allude to that a
joint communiqué signed by Foncha and Ahidjo on 3rd December 1960
amounted to a treaty and resulted in a valid political association of
the Southern Cameroons and Cameroun Republic. That claim is false on
several counts. First, contrary to what is claimed the document in
question, which has been in the public domain since January 1961, was
never intended to be a treaty and could not have been one. Object and
subject of international law cannot conclude a treaty. Ahidjo probably
had treaty-making capacity. But Foncha lacked such capacity in terms
of the Southern Cameroons Constitution Order in Council and the
Trusteeship Agreement for the British Cameroons. The head of
government in the Southern Cameroons at the time was JO Field,
Commissioner of the Southern Cameroons who assented to laws passed by
the House of Assembly, made appoints to the office of Minister of the
government of Southern Cameroons, and presided over the Executive
Council (Cabinet). Constitutionally, matters relating to defence and
foreign affairs lay with the British Government. That is why the
British questioned the normative status of the joint communiquét and
made it clear that Foncha signed it not for and on behalf of the
Southern Cameroons but in his capacity as leader of the KNDP. That
political party favoured the proposition for 'joining' Cameroun
Republic. The pertinent point is often overlooked that Foncha and his
party stood for the second plebiscite alternative. His efforts were
directed at obtaining from Cameroun Republic the best possible
constitutional terms of 'joining' so as to counter those offered by
Nigeria and so obtain a favourable vote. The British Government
included the Foncha-Ahidjo document in The Two Alternatives, a
pamphlet used for the plebiscite enlightenment campaign. But that was
only after Cameroun Republic had in its Note Verbale of 24 December
1960 formally requested the British Government to do so.
One of the three documents that Cameroun Republic attached to its Note
was the Foncha-Ahidjo joint communiqué. In the Note, Cameroun Republic
informed the British that the document resulted from 'conversations'
between Foncha and Ahidjo and declared elliptically that "it adheres
to the spirit" of the said documents "which indicate its desire for
unification with the Cameroons under British Administration on the
basis of a federation." The Note then concluded, "The Government of
the Republic of Cameroun request the British Embassy to consider the
attached communiqués as an expression of the official views of the
Republic and further request that they be published for the purposes
prescribed by Trusteeship Council resolution 2013 (XXVI)." The Note
Verbale constituted a unilateral act of a hetero-normative character
giving rise to an international legal obligation. It was taken as the
official undertaking given by Republic of Cameroun regarding the
meaning of the second plebiscite question. The relevance of the joint
communiqué and the other two documents attached to the Note was
derivative, for without the Note those documents would have been
meaningless and ineffectual. The Note, read together with the attached
documents constituted the unilateral undertaking of Cameroun Republic.
They were taken as Cameroun Republic's constitutional offer to the
Southern Cameroons in the same way as Nigeria's integrationist offer
of a "fully self-governing Region equal in all respects with the other
Regions in an independent Nigeria" was taken as that country's
constitutional offer to the Southern Cameroons. The two offers were
published side by side in the Two Alternatives.
An attentive reading of the phraseology of the constitutional offer by
Cameroun Republic shows that it was characteristically nebulous and
most economical in content. The Note stated that the joint communiqué
resulted from 'conversations'. The commitment given by Cameroun
Republic in the Note was merely to 'adhere to the spirit' of its
constitutional offer of a federation. That is another reason why the
document could not have been a treaty. No legally valid agreement or
treaty ever proceeds from mere 'conversations' without more. A party
to a treaty does not undertake simply to "adhere to the spirit" of the
instrument. Foncha probably thought he was concluding a binding
agreement. Ahidjo, a master of deceit, obfuscation and duplicity like
all Cameroun Republic leaders, did not. It follows that the parties
were not consensus ad idem. That goes to reinforce the legal
invalidity of the document as a treaty, as distinct from it being
expressive of a mere policy manoeuvre.
Secondly, the document in question was signed well before the
plebiscite and well before the date appointed by the United Nations
for 'joinder' to take place after certain due procedures would have
been followed. The document was thus in the nature of a mere policy
statement, a political promise of a future and uncertain event
(political association in the form of a federation) to happen. The
happening of that future event was itself also dependent upon the
happening of another uncertain one, a pro-Cameroun Republic vote at
the plebiscite. The implementation of the decision taken at the
plebiscite, even if it went in favour of 'joining' Cameroun Republic,
dependent yet on another future and uncertain event, namely,
evaluation of the results in the light of the recommendations of the
Fourth Committee: date of termination of the Trusteeship Agreement
with respect to the Southern Cameroons, date of achievement of
independence by the Southern Cameroons, finalization of the
arrangements by which the agreed and declared policies of the Southern
Cameroons and Cameroun Republic would be implemented, and date of
Southern Cameroons – Cameroun Republic political association. Thus
the Foncha-Ahidjo document did not evidence, and could not even have
purported to be evidence of, political association between the
Southern Cameroons and Cameroun Republic. At best the document could
be likened to a promise to do something upon the happening of some
future and uncertain event. A promise to do something is not the doing
of the thing promised. Even a valid promise to marry is not the
marriage itself. So to say the Foncha-Ahidjo joint communiqué attests
to a so-called 'reunification', an imaginary event, is simply
infantile and puerile.
3. Question of economic viability. The person you refer to also says
there was 'reunification' because Foncha and other Southern Cameroons
politicians conceded at the UN that the Southern Cameroons is
economically not viable. Just because those statements were made does
not mean the Southern Cameroons was indeed not economically viable.
Even those who are doubting Thomas now know that the Southern
Cameroons has always been economically viable. But why were those
statements made? It was all part of the British strategy to induce the
Southern Cameroons to return to Nigeria. The strategy started with Sir
Phillipson's 1959 consultancy report, commissioned by the British, on
the consequences of the separation of the Southern Cameroons from
Nigeria. In an interim report based only on a two-day visit to CDC
plantations in Tiko and Victoria, Sir Phillipson claimed that the
Southern Cameroons as an independent state would not be economically
viable. This was a rushed report. The British wanted it for use at the
upcoming 14th session of the United Nations General Assembly as
evidence of its claimed non-economic viability of the Southern
Cameroons so as to support "the consistent firmness" of its repeated
view at the UN that the Southern Cameroons must be integrated into
"the socially advanced protectorate of Nigeria." As the Southern
Cameroons delegation was preparing to leave for the UN, Sir Phillipson
purposely made the report available to the delegates so as to deflect
them from pushing for separate independence. At the UN Foncha, Mbile
and Ntumazah repeated Sir Phillipson's line. This was echoed by Edmond
of New Zealand, Espinosa of Mexico, and Sir Andrew Cohen of the UK who
also mentioned "the added difficulties concerning staff" (a comical
situation where the British were pleading their own failure to build
Southern Cameroons human capacity as a reason for denying the
territory independence). But Afghanistan and Guinea rightly pointed
out that the question of economic viability was irrelevant when it
comes to decolonization. Miss Brooks of Liberia who was in the chair
then concluded that paragraph 2 of the draft resolution before the
Committee "would serve to allay any apprehension that the Southern
Cameroons might become independent as a separate entity, an
eventuality which all were agreed should be ruled out in view of the
territory's limited economic potential."
Now all this was incorrect. First, in the law of self-determination it
is for the people to determine the destiny of the territory and not
for the territory to determine the destiny of the people. Secondly,
the economic viability issue was a red herring. If it was really a
critical issue one wonders why the UN never conducted an economic
assessment of the territory to determine is economic potential and
viability. Thirdly, after that UN session, and with the objective of
the economic non-viability thesis having been achieved, Sir Phillipson
proceeded with his consultancy assignment for another week and wrote a
final report. In the final report he stated that the interim report he
had released was "of restricted circulation as it seemed advisable
that those attending the 14th session of the General Assembly of the
United Nations from the Southern Cameroons should be acquainted with
my provisional conclusion." He then admitted that the interim report
was obsolete and should be disregarded. His final report came up with
a more nuanced conclusion to the effect that "as a completely
independent and sovereign state, the Southern Cameroons would not, at
its present stage of development, be viable." That was in 1959 and by
1961 even that final report had become out of date.
4. The SCHA and 'the Federal Constitution'. The person you mention in
your question also made the outlandish claim that the Southern
Cameroons House of Assembly "debated and adopted the Federal
Constitution which was then promulgated by President Ahidjo of
Republic of Cameroun on 1 October 1961." No one who reads what
transpired in the House of Assembly on that 18th September 1961 and
who understands simple plain English can possibly reach the conclusion
made by the person you refer to. In the afternoon of 14 September 1961
after the House had read for a third time and passed the Bill for a
law to amend the Labour Code Ordinance, the Premier of the Southern
Cameroons, JN Foncha, stood up and moved a motion. He said: "Mr.
Speaker, Sir, I beg to move the motion standing in my name: That this
Honourable House, taking into consideration the Constitution of the
future Federal Republic of Cameroon, approves the actions of the
Leaders of the Southern Cameroons in the negotiations with the
Government of the Republic of Cameroon concerning the form of the
future Federation and thanks the President and Government of the
Republic of Cameroon for the co-operative and brotherly manner in
which they have conducted negotiations. Sir, this motion seeks to ask
members to approve the manner in which members of this Government have
conducted negotiations with the Government of the Republic of
Cameroon, in bringing into being the Constitution which has now been
produced for the future Federation for the Cameroons." In plain simple
English the motion invited members of the House to say 'thank you' to
Southern Cameroons leaders for their action in securing a two-state
federation and to the President and Government of Cameroun Republic
for their cooperation in that endeavour.
The House adjourned and not even Foncha raised the motion again the
following day, September 15. In terms of the House Rules the motion
lapsed. Then on the 18th of September after the House had passed the
Finance Bill, the Minister of Finance, ST Muna, begged to move the
motion again. He did so in identical phraseology as four days earlier
by Foncha. He then craved the indulgence of the House to have the
motion on the Order Paper for that morning. Various House Members then
debated the motion. At the end, the Speaker put the question and it
was "agreed." Motion was then made and question proposed "that this
House do now adjourn sine die." The Southern Cameroons House of
Assembly then adjourned sine die on 18 September 1961 and is yet to
resume sitting.
Now, in an email on this subject the person you refer to speaks of
"motion regarding the draft constitution" and claims this to have been
culled from the Debates of the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly.
For self-serving reasons he fraudulently supplies a fictitious
heading: 'Motion to adopt the Draft Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Cameroon.' There is no such heading recorded anywhere in
the Hansard or official report of the proceedings of the House of
Assembly in that month of September 1961. There was no such motion on
any of the Order Papers of the House. In September 1961 there was no
document, even before the legislature of Cameroun Republic, known as
'the Draft Constitution of the Federal Republic of Cameroon'. How
could the House have been called upon to 'adopt' a 'draft'? Moreover,
the so-called Federal Constitution was passed into law on 14 August
1961 by the legislature of Cameroun Republic as an amendment law of
the 1960 Constitution of Cameroun Republic and promulgated on 1
September 1961. It was passed, in the words of the document itself, so
as "to facilitate the return of part of the territory of Cameroun
Republic". That was a veiled way of saying the law was passed so as to
facilitate the annexation of the Southern Cameroons. The document was
a piece of municipal law of a foreign country. The Southern Cameroons
House of Assembly could not have been so stupid as to purport to
debate and to adopt a law of a foreign legislature and one that
vaunted the annexation of the Southern Cameroons. The fact of the
matter is that there was no motion moved in the Southern Cameroons
House of Assembly for the adoption of the document in question. I
would suggest that the person you refer to betrays here a form of
intellectual dishonesty not too far removed from criminal deception.
5. Annexation. Every single jurist and social scientist that has
adverted their mind to the Southern Cameroons tragedy has come to the
unequivocal and settled conclusion that the Southern Cameroons was
annexed by Republic of Cameroon. I will consider the evidence from the
British and from Cameroon Republic before providing the overwhelming
view of writers who have paid attention to this issue.
The British Government concedes it transferred the Southern Cameroons
to Republic of Cameroon. It began by first refusing to grant the
Southern Cameroons independence on the ground that it would not be
economically viable. This refusal had no basis in fact or in law
because it is trite learning that economic viability has nothing to do
with achievement of political independence. Moreover, in the law of
self-determination it is for the people to determine the destiny of
the territory and not for the territory to determine the destiny of
the people. In January 1960, Lord Perth, Minister of State at the
Colonial Office shamefully declared, god-like, that "the Southern
Cameroons and its inhabitants are undoubtedly expendable". During
Anglo-Southern Cameroons talks in London in October 1960 Mr. Iain
Macleod the Secretary of State for the Colonies declared that if the
plebiscite went in favour of 'joining' Republic of Cameroun
arrangements would have to be made "for the early termination of
Trusteeship and the transfer of sovereignty to Republic [of
Cameroun]". In June 1960 the British Government declared its firm
opposition to an independent British Southern Cameroons in this
manner: "We are not attracted by the idea of an independent Southern
Cameroons because it would certainly not be able to pay its way and
... we are not at all anxious to have to do so on its behalf. We
cannot expect to get any advantage from being foster mother to an
independent Southern Cameroons and it is clear that it would have to
be fostered by somebody." This policy statement was repeated ad nausea
by Sir Andrew Cohen, Britain's Ambassador to the UN. In March 1961 the
British Colonial Office disclosed that Nigeria was fully informed of
"the discussions on the hand-over of the Southern Cameroons to the
Cameroun Republic". On 1 October 1961, Mr. Hugh Fraser, the
Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies informed the House of
Commons that as he was speaking, the British Government has already
"transferred the Southern Cameroons to Mr. Ahidjo". A month later, the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informed his Cabinet colleagues
that "the transfer of power went smoothly" This overwhelming body of
evidence is proof prositive that on 1 October 1961, the British
Government transferred the British Southern Cameroons to a successor
colonialist, the Republic of Cameroun, rather than allow the territory
to emerge into independence as ordained under international law.
Since the British Government exercised a colonial sovereignty over the
territory it could not have transferred to Republic of Cameroun other
than colonial sovereignty. The maxim of the law is nemo dat non quod
habet. The very idea of a trust meant the trusteeship was a
transitional arrangement. The Administering Authority had only
delegated and limited authority in the Trust Territory. It did not
enjoy an unrestricted plenitude of powers and thus could not for
example annex, cede, transfer or otherwise dispose of the Trust
Territory whether gratuitously or for value. In the face of this
admission of the British slavery-like transfer of the Southern
Cameroons to Cameroun Republic, are the wets propagating the
reunification rhetoric saying that the transfer is precisely what they
call 'reunification'?
Now, on its part, Republic of Cameroon claims that it did no more than
recover from Britain and the United Nations a part of its territory,
without saying when and how the Southern Cameroons was part of
Cameroun Republic and how it was then lost to Britain and the United
Nations. In August 1961 the President of Cameroun Republic claimed in
an address to his country's National Assembly that the United Nations,
by its Resolution 1608 (XV) of 21 April 1961, "imposed on [our
government] the obligation to adjust the institutional structures of
Cameroun Republic so as to received back a dismembered part of our
country". In a speech to his political party congress in Ebolowa in
July 1962 Ahidjo stated: "The reunification of the Southern Cameroons
and Cameroun Republic did not necessitate a fundamental change of the
constitution of Cameroun Republic, but only a minor amendment to allow
for part of the territory to rejoin the motherland … It was Cameroun
Republic which had to transform itself into a federation, taking into
account the return to it of a part of its territory …" On 1 September
1961, Republic of Cameroun passed a law in its Assembly amending its
Constitution by providing for the annexation of the British Southern
Cameroons. The long title of that law which was deceptively passed off
as 'the federal constitution' recited that Cameroun Republic amended
its constitution "so as to allow the return of part of its territory."
This annexation of the British Southern Cameroons is akin to Hitler's
annexation of Austria in 1939. In the same month of September 1961,
the French-led forces of Republic of Cameroun marched into the British
Southern Cameroons, killed several citizens, destroyed property and
occupied the territory. In spite of this aggression and the violation
of the territorial integrity of the Southern Cameroons by Republic of
Cameroun, its President was invited by the British Government to the
British Southern Cameroons on 30 September 1961. Britain then formally
transferred powers it exercised over the territory to him, hurriedly
left the territory and has since acted Pontus Pilate each time it is
reminded of its indecent abandonment of the British Southern
Cameroons.
We then see a consistent theme in Cameroun Republic's rhetoric. The
theme is that the Southern Cameroons is part of its territory; that it
simply got back the Southern Cameroons officially on 1 October 1961
and hence what it calls 'reunification'. This convoluted rhetoric is
simply designed to mask the fact of annexation. The Southern Cameroons
has never been part of Cameroun Republic. So no question of
reunification arises and will ever arise. When a hitherto estranged
part of a country is returned to it, there is simply a recovery of
territory without the need for a plebiscite. Walvis Bay was returned
to Namibia, Hong Kong to China, Alsace- Lorraine to France, and Ifni
to Morocco. There was no plebiscite in any of these cases and none of
them was characterized as reunification? Nor was the union of the Gold
Coast and British Togoland, of British Somaliland and Italian
Somaliland, of New Guinea and Papua, and of Tanganyika and Zanzibar
characterized as cases of reunification even though in each case there
could be found a distant and remote historical connection between the
two uniting countries.
As earlier indicated, the overwhelming view of even authors who are
not citizens of the Southern Cameroons and who have examined the
evidence is that the Southern Cameroons was indeed annexed by Cameroun
Republic. Aboya Endong Manasse writes, "A federal constitution adopted
on 1 September 1961 … established a very centralized system in which
the Southern Cameroons saw its autonomy gradually whittled away up to
the point of total annexation. … The exploitation of … oil marked the
beginning of the acceleration of the process of enforced
franconisation." ('Ménaces sécessionistes sur l'Etat camerounais,' Le
Monde Diplomatique, Décembre 2002, no. 585, p.12). Luc Sindjoun
another citizen of Cameroun Republic also writes that the 'federation'
was a mere make-belief strategy by Cameroun Republic designed to
hoodwink the United Nations and the Southern Cameroons. It was "a
federalism of absorption of the Southern Cameroons by Cameroun
Republic … a phagocytosis strategy" and it "was used to procure the
enlargement of Cameroun Republic." He also writes that on the 30th
September 1961 at Buea the Government of the United Kingdom solemnly
transferred sovereignty over the Southern Cameroons to Ahidjo. (L'Etat
Ailleur. Entre noyau dur et case vide, Paris, 2002, pp. 127-129, 171).
Exactly the same conclusion was arrived at by other citizens of
Cameroun Republic such as Lekene Donfack, and François Mbome ('Les
expériences de la révision constitutionnelle au Cameroun,' Pénant, no.
808, janvier – avril 1992, p.20).
Pierre Messmer, the last colonial governor of French Cameroun, states
that on 1 October 1961 Ahidjo effected the annexation of the Southern
Cameroons to Cameroun Republic. He points out that the so-called
federal constitution provided merely for "a sham federation, which
was, except in appearance, an annexation of the Southern Cameroons."
"President Ahidjo came up with a draft deceptive federal constitution
carefully written for him by his French lawyers. Ngu Foncha … accepted
without discussions what was, except in appearance, an annexation."
(Les blancs s'en vont – Recit de Decolonisation, Paris, 1998,
134-135). Philippe Gaillard states that there was no union on 1
October 1961 and that what took place was a mere border adjustment.
(Ahmadou Ahidjo: Patriote et Despote, Batisseur de l'Etat Camerounais,
Paris, 1994, p.123). Stark argues that a federation in the sense of a
voluntary relationship between political units did not exist. He
points out that there was no true and genuine federation and that in
reality the Southern Cameroons was incorporated into Cameroon
Republic. ('Federalism in Cameroon: The Shadow and the Reality,'
Canadian Journal of African Studies, vol. x, no.3, 1976, p.441). In
the Northern Cameroons case it was opined that "on 1 October 1961 …
the Southern Cameroons joined the Republic of Cameroon within which it
then became incorporated." (ICJ Reports, 1963, at p. 22).
J. Vanderlinden concludes that the federation was merely a smoke
screen meant to enable the Southern Cameroons to swallow the bitter
pill of its annexation by Cameroun Republic, as in the case of Eritrea
annexed by Ethiopia. (L'Etat Federal, Etat Africain de l'An 2000?' in
L'Etat Moderne Horizon 2000, LGDJ, Paris, 1985, p.307). J Crawford
cites the Southern Cameroons as one of a number of former colonial
territories 'integrated in a state'. ('State Practice and
International Law in relation to Unilateral Secession,' Report 1997,
para 21) Jacques Benjamin says there was a creeping annexation of the
Southern Cameroons by Cameroun Republic. (Les Camerounais Occidentaux
– La Minorité dans un Etat Bi-communautaire, Montreal, 1972). Deltombe
et al. write: "Ahidjo effected the political asphyxiation of the
Anglophone newcomers. He did so … at the Foumban 'constitutional
conference' where his French advisers devised a water-tight plan
which, under the pretext of an egalitarian federation, consisted in
reality in the annexation of the Southern Cameroons to the centralized
and authoritarian system already in force in Yaoundé since the
previous year. … In the purest of French traditions Ahidjo annexed the
Southern Cameroons … thanks to the help of his clever French advisers.
He then quickly embarked on a policy of forcible cultural assimilation
with the help of 'la Coopération Française', as always. … Noting the
effects of this enforced political and cultural assimilation, Bernard
Fonlon, a native of the annexed country, quickly sounded the following
alarm: 'In two or three generations, we shall be French'." (Kamerun!
Une Guerre Cachée aux Origines de la Françafrique 1948-1971, Paris,
2011, pp. 483-485).
6. Foumban. Over the years inattentive commentators have been misled
into believing that Foumban was a credible 'constitutional conference'
that produced a constitution, the so-called federal constitution. In
reality Foumban was all a hoax. It was a political feint and a
jamboree planned and carried out by Cameroun Republic and its French
puppeteers. First of all, the place and time of that meeting was
chosen by Cameroun Republic. Secondly, the chosen venue was
deliberate: Foumban, an isolated place in an active insurgency region
in a Cameroun Republic that was in the throes of a maquisard rebellion
was a very high security risk area. That meant the Southern Cameroons
delegation was in effect held captive and could not discontinue its
participation at the meeting and safely find its way back home in the
event where it was minded to stage a walk out. July is a rainy season
month and even for a robust Land rover it normally took about six
hours on the dusty/muddy bush tract to cross the frontier at Santa to
Bamenda and another two days to get to Buea travelling via
Bali-Mamfe-Kumba. The strategy of choosing such a remote enclave
(rather than say Buea, Yaounde, or Douala) was to induce in the
Southern Cameroons delegation a siege mentality and reinforce their
isolation. Thirdly, consider this: 16 July – Southern Cameroons
delegation flies from Tiko airport to Koutaba airstrip and travels by
road, a dusty bumpy road, for hours to Foumban where they arrive in
the late afternoon to a staged welcome by a rented crowd. That same
evening the delegation was taken to attend a ceremony of singing and
dancing that went well into the night. The delegation had had a long
and tedious journey and had had no time to rest and to caucus.
Meanwhile, Cameroun Republic put in place another of its rehearsed
strategies: corruption of members of the Southern Cameroons
delegation. It stocked the fridges in the rooms of members of the
delegation with assorted alcoholic drinks and, pimp-like, procured
girls to standby to warm the beds of delegates. 17 July – the Southern
Cameroons and Cameroon Republic delegations moved to a hall in a
teachers' training college for the meeting. The whole morning session
was taken up with long circumlocutory speeches of doubtful value.
At the end of the speeches Ahidjo tossed at the Southern Cameroons
delegation a document he said was a draft constitution and rudely
asked them for their observations. Taken aback the Southern Cameroons
delegation requested three weeks to go and study the document but
Ahidjo insisted on their observations within two days, there and then.
The view has since been peddled that Ahidjo supposedly gave Foncha a
copy of a draft constitution which Foncha allegedly hid from
everybody. But no one has ever produced that document so that a
comparison can be made with the one tendered at Foumban. No one has
been able to say whether or not the document tossed in the face of the
Southern Cameroons delegation at Foumban was the very one allegedly
given to Foncha some months earlier or even whether it was the
document drafted by Ahidjo's French draftsman, Jacques Rousseau. Be
that as it may, the Southern Cameroons delegation was shocked by
Ahidjo's improper conduct. They had participated in constitutional
conferences in Nigeria and the UK and in delicate political
conferences in Mamfe and Bamenda. These had all been meaningful
engagements. They thought Foumban was going to be even more meaningful
in the sense that together with Cameroun Republic delegation they were
jointly going to draft a constitution, laying a solid foundation for
the future federal political association between the two countries.
Cameroun Republic, always up to no good, had other ideas of the
meeting.
Mbile cried out in disbelief: "We have the feeling that we have wasted
our time coming to Foumban for the draft to be tabled to us for our
observations in this way. This is in total contradiction to our
expectations; instead of a draft confederal constitution, we are being
requested to make observations on a draft highly centralized
constitution with unlimited powers." Endeley warned: "Too much haste
would have far-reaching consequences on the people of the Cameroons."
And Jua screamed in utter consternation: "I have never seen people
expected to write a constitution in two days." At this point the
Southern Cameroons delegation could have justifiably abandoned the
meeting, returned to Buea, declared Foumban a failure and aborted the
policy of political association with Cameroun Republic. But as noted
earlier at Foumban the delegation was in effect taken hostage. From
the afternoon of 17 July to the afternoon of 20 July the Southern
Cameroons delegation pored through the Ahidjo document while members
of the Cameroun Republic delegation simply loafed and indulged
themselves. The observations of the Southern Cameroons delegation were
handed to Ahidjo in the evening of 20 July and the following day, 21
July, closing speeches were made. That was the end of what some have
claimed was 'Foumban constitutional conference'!! Your readers would
notice that even those individuals Ahidjo tagged along as part of his
delegation were in fact mere spectators in his organized fraud.
The truth of the matter is that Foumban was never intended to be and
was never a constitutional conference. This is what really happened.
Soon after United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1608 (XV) of 21
April 1961, the French and the British met for three months, from May
to July, hoping to write a constitution to underpin a federal
political association of the two Cameroons, that is to say, a federal
constitution as Cameroun Republic had committed itself to in its
pre-plebiscite constitutional offer to the Southern Cameroons. On the
French side the draftsman was a law lecturer called Jacques Rousseau
and on the English side was an Attorney whose name Rousseau had since
forgotten. The French are forever seeking any form of revenge against
the British for humiliating them at Fashoda in 1890. This was one
occasion they felt they should get at the British. They succeeded in
outwitting the British in this constitution-making exercise. Deltombe
et al. relate the following edifying account: "Regarding the writing
of the federal constitution in 1961, as in the case of the writing of
the Cameroun Republic 1960 constitution, what went on behind the
political scenes was more revealing especially concerning Cameroun
Republic's motives. Distinct and separate from the Foumban meeting of
the delegations of the two Cameroons, the 'drafters' from the two
sides, Jacques Rousseau for Cameroun Republic and a British Attorney
for the Southern Cameroons, regularly met to draft the federal
constitution. For three months the atmosphere was tense between the
two European draftsmen. Jacques Rousseau made the following disclosure
during an interview in 2008: 'The British Attorney proposed a
convoluted text. I remember that his primary concern was about human
rights, like every British in fact. It was really ridiculous. We, the
French, Ahidjo and Kame, had prepared a cunning document of a
federative nature, where all political power rested with the federal
president. In the document I provided for something nasty, a federal
president invested with all powers. Here, it is better to have one
potentate than many: an enlightened despotism of sorts'." (p. 483)
Rousseau was speaking 47 years later and at the evening of his life he
was still able to poke fun at the British.
Abakwatimes: Can you explain to our readers within the context of the
Southern Cameroons and the state of Cameroun's dispute the difference
between 'UNIFICATION' and 'RE-UNIFICATION'?
As I have said there was no reconstitution of extinct 'Kamerun' in
1961 or at any time after that date. It was and shall ever be
infeasible for that to happen. The 'reunification' of 'Kamerun' would
have entailed bringing together the Southern Cameroons, the Northern
Cameroons (part of Nigeria since June 1961), Cameroun Republic, the
Neue Kamerun (part of Gabon and Congo Brazzaville), and the Duckbill
(part of Chad and Central African Republic). The projected political
association of the Southern Cameroons and Cameroun Republic in 1961
cannot credibly be touted as reunification for the simple reason that
the Southern Cameroons and Cameroun Republic never at any time formed
a single political entity and then later became separated, in which
case the projected political association could then have been
accurately said to have been 'reunification.' It is futile trying to
go back to the territory over which Germany proclaimed a protectorate
in 1884. Let the record be put straight. There was no Kamerun nation
in 1884 or at any time before or after that date. The area depicted in
colonial maps as Kamerun at the time of Germany's defeat in World War
I was inhabited by a multitude of distinct and far flung tribal
communities with hardly any connection or anything in common with each
other. As of 1914 only in the coastal area was there any sense of the
existence of Kamerun. What was claimed in 1884 was the Dwala (Douala)
mud flat estuarine enclave. That was the territory, and none other,
that the Duala chiefs handed over and could have handed over to the
Germans. In 1884 the Ambas Bay coastal strip (Bimbia to Bakassi) and
its hinterland was British and not part of the German Kamerun. Even
when it was later ceded to Germany in 1887 it was quickly retaken by
the British in August 1914 and became the British Cameroons. Germany's
original Douala estuary protectorate proclaimed in 1884 and
subsequently extended inland went to France and it became French
Cameroun. The idea that there was a Kamerun nation that was
partitioned or dismembered following the defeat of Germany is an
elephantine political falsehood peddled over the years to serve a
hegemonic agenda.
There could not have been and there was no 'reunification' for the
following additional reasons. At the plebiscite there was no such
offer as 'reunification' as a choice. Such an offer would have been a
complete negation of the international tutelage system and the United
Nations Charter. Since there was no such choice there could not have
been a vote for an inexistent alternative. Further, reunification
would have made a complete nonsense of the plebiscite itself. If the
Southern Cameroons was a part of Cameroun Republic the plebiscite
would have been redundant and the territory simply returned to
Cameroun Republic like Ifni to Morocco or Hong Kong to China. The
indiscriminate and promiscuous use of the terms 'unification' and
'reunification' by some people is reflective of poverty of thought.
Those who talk of 'reunification' seem unaware that even at Foumban
the supposedly welcoming banner at the meeting room proclaimed, 'Vive
le Cameroun unifié'. The banner did not say, and could not have said,
'Vive la République du Cameroun unifiée', 'Vive la République du
Cameroun reunifiée', 'Vive le Cameroun reunifié', or 'Vive le Kamerun
unifié/reunifié'. Cameroun Republic's Note Verbale of 24 December 1960
spoke of unification and not reunification.
Two or more countries can unify to form one country whether they had
any previous historical connection or not with each other. Sometimes
the word 'united' or 'union' is used to denote such unification as in
United States of America, United Kingdom, Union of Socialist Soviet
Republics, United Republic of Tanzania. Sometimes the new country
takes a completely new name as in the case of the union of the Gold
Coast and British Togoland which saw Ghana as the new name of the
conjoint countries, or the union of British Somaliland and Italian
Somaliland which took Somalia as the name of the new state, or again
the union of Zanzibar and Tanganyika which gave rise to Tanzania.
Sometimes also the names of the uniting countries are simply conjoined
as in the case of the union of New Guinea and Papua where the new
country took the name Papua New Guinea. So, conceivably there could
have been a union or unification of the Southern Cameroons and
Cameroun Republic resulting in a new name for the new state. Since two
or more countries cannot unite informally, a union of the Southern
Cameroons and Cameroun Republic would have resulted in a new state and
a new name and would have been on clear terms set out in a union
agreement subscribed by the two uniting countries. This did not
happen. Contraptions such as 'federal republic of Cameroon' and
'united republic of Cameroon' despotically decreed into existence were
not genuine legal and political expressions. They were strategies for
effecting the annexation of the Southern Cameroons and to enable its
people to adjust to the francophonity and the French world of Cameroun
Republic. In the mindset of Cameroun Republic's colonial-minded
political leaders the term unification quickly metamorphosed within a
matter of months into reunification. The shift was meant to
soft-cushion and whitewash territorial expansion, annexation, and
colonial occupation.
Cameroun Republic claims it simply recovered the Southern Cameroons as
part of its territory returned to it by the UN, but it has been unable
to say when and how it acquired the Southern Cameroons and when and
how it lost the territory to the United Nations. Cameroun Republic
chose to ignore international law. It conveniently forgets that in
1961 it made a similar claim in respect of the British Northern
Cameroons but it was rejected in 1963 by the International Court of
Justice in the Northern Cameroons case. Following the rejection of
that claim Cameroun Republic declared the British Northern Cameroons
its Alsace-Lorraine, promising to recover it. It then decreed 1st June
an annual day of 'mourning' for what it claimed to be the loss of part
of its territory. But one year afterwards no one ever heard again of
Cameroun Republic's Annual Day of National Mourning and of its
thoroughly misplaced Alsace-Lorraine analogy.
When the President of the occupying State suddenly announces an
impending journey to Buea, capital of the Southern Cameroons, to
'celebrate' an imaginary 'reunification', he is provocatively going to
Buea to commemorate colonial occupation by staging a Roman-like
'victory parade'. In this instance though there is no military victory
for the Camerounese occupation forces to show. Cameroun Republic
cannot show evidence of any conquest by bullet or even by pen. Going
to Buea to 'celebrate' colonial occupation is adding insult to injury
because the message that is being communicated is this: "I am here in
Buea. Yes, you have been annexed. You can go and drink the sea." As
part of the preparation for that 'celebration' the ever scheming
rulers of Cameroun Republic plotted to knock down the Schloss. The
reason is that they cannot stand the powerful symbolism of Southern
Cameroons statehood that the Schloss represents. It is the same strong
power of the symbolism of the name Victoria that prompted them to
purport to change it to 'Limbe' in the hope of wiping out a piece of
our shining history. Now they must be devising ways by which to move
Buea Mountain, Victoria sea front, and Bakassi to their territory.
Well might they ever spend troubled nights! Geography too is on our
side. It is the same geography that impelled the Germans to move the
capital of their original Kamerun colonial territory from Douala to
Buea in the territory they had just newly acquired.
The falsity that any such event as 'reunification' took place on 1
October 1961 can be seen in another respect. Before that date Cameroun
Republic purported to exercise acts of sovereignty in the Southern
Cameroons even while it was still a UN trust territory. And in October
1961 Cameroun Republic's 'Inspecteur Fédéral d'Administration' simply
stepped into the shoes of the run-away British Commissioner of the
Southern Cameroons. The President of Cameroun Republic himself assumed
the role and functions previous carried out by the UK Government in
relation to the Southern Cameroons.
Ironically, the reunification rhetoric would seem to apply more to the
proposition for joinder to Nigeria than to Cameroun Republic. The
Southern Cameroons had 45 years of intense and fruitful and
constitutional association with Nigeria. It was separated from Nigeria
on 1 October 1960. So in 1961 the plebiscite alternative of joining
Nigeria could well have been touted as reunification of the Nigerian
polity. But that language was never used and even the joinder of the
British Northern Cameroons to Nigeria was never and has never been
presented as reunification.
Abakwatimes: Apart from the claim of Southern Cameroons that void of a
Union Treaty Cameroun's extension of its internationally recognized
border amounts to occupation. Is there any other claim under law that
gives the Southern Cameroons the right to a state to a state of its
own?
Answer: The claim of the Southern Cameroons to sovereign statehood is
solidly anchored in international law, human rights law, and the law
of nature. The British transfer of the Southern Cameroons to Cameroun
Republic was in breach of the Trusteeship Agreement for the British
Cameroons, in breach of the United Nations Charter, and in breach of
the binding 1960 UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples. Britain now admits it made mistakes in
the decolonization of the Southern Cameroons but argues that whatever
mistakes may have been made by a colonial power in relation to its
colonial territory the moment the colonial territory achieves
independence the former colonial power falls off. This general
statement is correct. The operative phrase however is 'achieve
independence'. Did the Southern Cameroons achieve independence? The
weight of evidence conclusively establishes that it never did and that
it was and has remained an annexed territory.
The people of the Southern Cameroons have under international human
rights law the inalienable right to self-determination. They have the
right to identity, to nationality, and to sovereignty over their land
and natural resources. They are entitled to the enjoyment of the right
to peace, the principle of sovereignty and equality of all peoples,
and the right to freedom from colonial domination and oppression. The
people of the Southern Cameroons are an oppressed people. They have
the right to free themselves from the bonds of domination by any means
under international law. Every people have the right to exist. Every
people also have the right not to be dominated by another people. The
inhabitants of the Southern Cameroons are a people and have the right
to exist as such. They have the right to be free from the domination
of the people of Republic of Cameroun and, as a concomitant of that
right, they have the right to resist colonial occupation and
domination. The eternal law of self-preservation and human dignity
imposes upon them the imperative to rid themselves of their
humiliating status and condition of a people under captivity. The
right to resist and end colonial bondage is a natural right. Colonial
occupation is aggression and a vicious form of terrorism, resistance
to which is an obligatory act of self-defence.
Colonial occupation of the Southern Cameroons by Republic of Cameroun
is palpable everywhere in the territory: the spoliation of resources
by Cameroun Republic; the ubiquity of soldiers and the imperious
administrators of Cameroun Republic, all speaking and operating in
French; the pervasiveness of Cameroun Republic's symbols of statehood
(flag, anthem, currency, name); and Cameroun Republic's ruthless
attack on the English language and administrative system, and the
onslaught on the values, and the legal and educational systems of the
Southern Cameroons. This is not only armed occupation and political
domination. It is also economic, social and cultural imperialism.
What is going on in the Southern Cameroons is a grave attack on the
humanity, the human dignity, the worth, the identity, the existence
and the survival of the people of that country. The (O)AU has
repeatedly reaffirmed the solemn pledge to "eradicate all forms of
colonialism from Africa". It has undertaken "to eliminate colonialism,
neo-colonialism … and all forms of discrimination" from Africa.
Colonialism is a practice of domination which involves the subjugation
of one people by another and the political and economic control of a
dependent territory through various techniques. Colonialism is
moreover an appalling human tragedy because of its abhorrent
brutality, its magnitude, its organized nature and its negation of the
existence of the colonized people. It has therefore earned universal
opprobrium.
Cameroun Republic cannot set up the principle of territorial integrity
against the legitimate entitlement of the people of the Southern
Cameroons to self-determination. The principle of territorial
integrity is confined to the sphere of relations between states and
cannot be implicated especially in a case of the exercise of the right
of self-determination against colonial rule, oppression, or
expansionism. The only amount of territory, the integrity of which
Republic of Cameroun can legitimately claim to be entitled to protect
is the territorial framework that devolved upon it as state successor
to French Cameroun on the basis of the pre-existing boundaries as
established by treaties and which it inherited on achievement of
independence from France on 1 January 1960. That spatial configuration
of Cameroun Republic does not, has never included and will never
include the territory of the Southern Cameroons. The
self-determination claim of the people of the Southern Cameroons does
not impinge in any way whatsoever on the territorial integrity of
Cameroun Republic. The borders of that State, as they stood on the
date of its independence, are in no way impaired. The
self-determination claim of the people of the Southern Cameroons does
not entail a change or an alteration of the well delimited and
demarcated frontier between the Southern Cameroons and Cameroun
Republic as established by the Anglo-French boundary treaties, a
frontier Cameroun Republic succeeded to on the date of its
independence. Legal title to the Southern Cameroons vests in the
people of the territory and prevails over effective colonial
occupation of the territory by Cameroun Republic. It is not possible
for Cameroun Republic to have acquired legal title to the Southern
Cameroons whether by cession, annexation or conquest. These are no
longer valid modes of territorial acquisition in international law.
Cameroun Republic, a former UN trust territory under French
administration, emerged from colonial status into sovereign statehood
and succeeded to title over French Cameroun by virtue of the principle
of self-determination. There is no principle of law or morality on
which Cameroun Republic can base its bigotry that the Southern
Cameroons, which was also a UN trust territory, is inhabited by people
of a lesser order and therefore not similarly entitled to emerge from
colonial status into sovereign statehood by virtue of the selfsame
principle of self-determination. According to Cameroun Republic the
plebiscite vote automatically made the Southern Cameroons a part of
Cameroun Republic. This interpretation is erroneous. The plebiscite
vote was additionally a vote to "join" (understood by both countries
to mean to "federate"), not a vote to be annexed. There was nothing
the people of the Southern Cameroons could possibly have stood to gain
by nonsensically voting to be annexed or absorbed by the
French-speaking tyrannical, despotic and illiberal state of Cameroun
Republic. The Southern Cameroons could not by any stretch of the
imagination have voted for a detrimental change in its political
status. It could not possibly have voted against its political,
economic, social and cultural well-being. That would have been totally
against human nature and the human instinct for dignity,
self-preservation and self-development.
While the Southern Cameroons voted to achieve independence it also
expressed its willingness to enter into a limited form of federal
political association with Cameroun Republic. Federation involves a
dovetailing rather than a supersession of legal orders; a cohabitation
under the same roof but in different households. A vote to join is not
the same thing as an act of joining. An expression of an intention to
join does not mean actual joining. A promise or even an agreement to
marry is not the marriage itself. Both parties must fulfill all the
conditions for a valid marriage and go through the ceremony of
marriage, which ends with the signing by both parties and their
witnesses of the marriage certificate. The Southern Cameroons and
Cameroun Republic never went through any ceremony of "joining"
attested by a treaty of union duly signed by the parties and deposited
with the Secretariat of the UN as required by Article 102 of the UN
Charter.
The grabbing of the Southern Cameroons by Cameroun Republic following
Britain's hurried departure is annexation and colonial occupation, not
"joining'. It may be likened to kidnapping and rape combined since it
involved the forcible assumption of authority over the territory and
the violation of its territorial integrity. Even if the contemplated
"joining" had taken place, the people of the Southern Cameroons would
still be entitled to exercise the right to self-determination in the
face of overwhelming evidence of on-going domination, oppression,
persecution, massive and unremitting human rights abuse, and denial of
self-government and of the right to exist as a people. Besides, on
general principles, a right to contract in implies a right to contract
out; a power of entry implies a power of exit; a power to opt in
implies a power to opt out. Apologists of colonial occupation are
sometimes heard to 'argue' that the political leaders of the Southern
Cameroons were naïve and got us into this tragedy. This is a case of
blaming the victim rather than the victimizer. In any event, if my
parents sold me into slavery I have no business accepting my status
and condition of a slave. I have every right in the world to free
myself from slavery. Slaves have been doing that from the time of
Spartacus down to this day!
The annexation of the Southern Cameroons by Republic of Cameroun is
expansionism. It is territorial change brought about in breach of
international law. In other words, it is territorial change in
violation of (i) the territorial integrity of the Southern Cameroons,
(ii) the principle of uti possidetis juris, and (iii) the Constitutive
Act of the African Union which, in Article 4 b, imposes on AU Member
States, as did the 1964 OAU binding Resolution on Border Disputes, the
legal obligation to respect the borders existing on the date each
State achieved independence.
For the people of the Southern Cameroons the francophonity imposed
upon them and the ubiquity, brutality and rapacity of Cameroun
Republic civil and armed functionaries in their territory are living
symbols of alien domination and the daily reminders of their shameful
status as a colonized and oppressed people. These functionaries are
seen and experienced as living symbols in who are combined tyranny and
colonialism, wickedness and iniquity.

Abakwatimes: In a paper you submitted as a contribution to a book
project, you argued that the principle of Uti possidetis applies to
all peoples. Can you explain this principle with respect to the
Southern Cameroons struggle?
Answer: This is in fact what I say in that publication: Successful
self-determination claims since the end of European colonization
constitute evidence of state practice borne out of the conviction that
contemporary human rights law recognizes self-determination as a
continuing right that is not necessarily inconsistent with the
principles of uti possidetis and respect for territorial integrity.
The right to self-determination, which now has the character of jus
cogens, is not only a procedural right available in the process of
decolonization and by which the inhabitants of a colonial territory
freely decide their political status. It is also a substantive human
right, the right of all peoples to self-rule or sovereign statehood
and, like all human rights it is inherent, continuing, unquestionable
and inalienable. It may be invoked by a people subjected to
circumstances such as domination, oppression, genocide, colonization,
and other gross human rights abuses, and is available even in the
context of a decolonized country.
The well-established principle of territorial integrity protects the
geographical space that legally belongs to a state and is secured by a
series of consequential rules, namely, rules prohibiting interference
within the domestic jurisdiction of a state, rules forbidding the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political
independence of states, rules imposing respect for borders as they
were on the date of independence, and the rule of obligatory
non-recognition of territorial changes brought about in breach of
international law. The principle serves two basic purposes. It gives
legal protection to the legitimate territorial configuration of a
state, and so necessarily frowns on secession and
annexation/occupation. It confines the exercise of territorial
sovereignty to the spatial area that lawfully belongs to the state
and, by necessary implication, forbids territorial expansion or other
forms of imperialism.
The principle of uti possidetis (literally translated to: 'as you
possess, you shall continue to possess') ordains that a state shall
continue to possess the same amount of territory it possessed as of a
particular critical date which, for de-colonized states, is the date
of independence. This principle sanctifies succession to colonial
boundaries as they stood on the date of independence by the successor
state. Frontiers do not disappear when decolonization or state
succession takes place. Nascent states may not therefore change the
colonially-inherited territorial status quo by extending their
boundaries.
In 1964, African leaders adopted a resolution on Border Disputes among
African States by which they pledged "to respect the borders existing
on their achievement of national independence." This principle is
reiterated in Article 4 b of the Constitutive Act of the African Union
and also in the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace
and Security Council of the African Union. Arguably, the principle has
now crystallized into, and acquired the status of, a rule of African
regional customary international law and is therefore binding on
African states. Like the principle of territorial integrity, uti
possidetis is meant to prevent irredentist claims and expansionism.

Abakwatimes: You have been at the forefront of the Southern Cameroons
struggle for more than 20 years. During this time you have convened
conferences, undertaken diplomatic initiatives and challenged the
legality of the Cameroun's rule in an international jurisdiction. Can
you be very precise where the struggle stands at the moment and what
options are left for the people of Southern Cameroons?
Answer: I see our people absolutely ready to break tomorrow the chains
of bondage with which we have been shackled for more than fifty long
years. No people ever remained chained forever. The Day of Liberation
inexorably comes. Sometimes it can be seen coming. Sometimes it
happens unexpectedly. It shall be the case here. God has spoken. His
ways are mysterious. The rain is gone and we can see more clearly now.
I see the generality of our people resolutely committed to take their
destiny into their own hands, as they should. I see them ready to free
themselves from one of the vilest and most rapacious forms of
colonialism that surpasses apartheid in its cunning, deception,
duplicity and make-belief.
Every colonized people are confronted with two choices, fight or
surrender. No colonized people have ever surrendered to the colonial
authority. The reason is simple. To surrender would mean to renounce
one's humanity and to cease to be a human being. Any people that
surrender to colonial occupation and rule sink to the level of a mere
commodity. They become, together with their property and their natural
environment, commodified.
In the contemporary period the colonized people of the Southern
Cameroons have available to them the following three legal and
legitimate pathways to liberation: litigation, diplomatic initiative,
armed struggle, or a combination of any of these. Historically, the
litmus test of a dependent people's readiness and ability to take full
control of their land and to assert and defend its territorial
integrity is of course continuing revolt and armed struggle or
consensual decolonization. Litigation and diplomatic activism have
severe limitations though it is often the case that they are critical
in giving added teeth to armed struggle. For all the noise one hears
about peace and the peaceful resolution of disputes, preventive
diplomatic intervention is often rare. Which option is taken might
well depend on a number of salient factors and strategic
considerations.
We do have our fair share of the Judases, Pétains and Quislings of
this world. For every twelve there is likely to be a Judas; for every
Samson there is likely to be a Delilah; and for every occupied country
there are bound to be renegades and those willing and ready to sell
for eight or twelve pieces of silver. For every action taken to leave
the Egyptian house of bondage there are bound to be those who think
their lot as slaves is better than their lot as free people. These are
people who have ended up selling their lives, their spouses, their
children, and their personhood and peace of mind for the position of a
slave. For every platoon of scouts sent to reconnoiter the Promised
Land there will be those among them who will give scare-mongering
reports proclaiming that the illegal occupants of the Homeland are a
great multitude of unconquerable giants. They look at all the 'big
people' in the colonizing power and say they are too strong. Naaman
too was a 'big man' and strong. He was a mighty and brave general. But
he had leprosy! Many are unable to see that "the army that fights for
us is larger than the one against us", an invisible heavenly army of
fire all around our Homeland poised to do battle at His appointed
hour. So let us not be troubled by the seeming invincibility of the
other side. Let us not be troubled by collaborationists and the
faint-hearted. They serve a certain purpose in God's mysterious scheme
of things. And God said to Pharaoh, let my people go. And Pharaoh
hardened his heart. And the Lord afflicted his household and his land.
And Pharaoh drowned in the Red Sea! It shall be like that. Before the
festive season the Lord shall speak.



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The thing always happens that you really believe in; and the belief in
a thing makes it happen.

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