Southern Cameroons: Another Winnable Case Against La Republique du Cameroun

Southern Cameroons: Another Winnable Case Against La Republique du Cameroun

Tumasang Martin
Barrister at law, International Arbitrator, Chartered Surveyor, Property Valuer, Claims Quantum Consultant.

MRICS [London], MCIArb [London], ABIFM [UK], ADIAC[Dubai], Barrister [Inner Temple London], PhD [Sheffield H University], LLM with merit (Oil and Gas Law) [Robert Gordon University Aberdeen], MSc (Construction Law and Dispute Resolution) [Leeds Metropolitan University], MSc (Prop Valuation) [Sheffield H University], Bar Professional (BPTC) [BPP University College London], PGDip [Sheffield H University], Graduate Diploma Law [Hertfordshire University], BSc (Hons) Quantity Surveying [University of Ife]

Introduction

As I have previously stated, Southern Cameroons has a winnable case but the problem is that the message/case being put across is so convoluted with parts with parts of it that are totally opposable to international law and not sustainable. I have stated repeatedly that a case based on the intention of the parties, the non achievement of intentions by the de facto union, and the non acceptance of the outcome by Southern Cameroons is a winnable case since it aligns with international law on such matters.

The question that falls to be determined is whether there is another case against La Republique du Cameroon that is winnable. In order to answer this all important question, a systematic approach has to be followed as shown below:

1.    What are the obligations of La Republique towards Southern Cameroons or towards the international community?

2.    When or how was such an obligation created?

3.    When and how was such an obligation breached?

Actionable obligations on state parties are usually created by treaties. In the absence of a treaty obligation that Southern Cameroons can hold La Republique du Cameroun against, is there some other mechanism where actionable obligations binding on La Republique du Cameroon can be created?. I think so.

Reasoning

In order to carry my readership at this point, I posit that reference to perhaps some case law might be more helpful than for me to be explaining recondite legal concepts at this juncture.

On 17 March 2005, Ms Mukabagwiza, Minister of Justice of Rwanda, at the Sixty-first Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights said

"Rwanda is one of the countries that has ratified the greatest number of international human rights instruments. In 2004 alone, our Government ratified ten of them, including those concerning the rights of women, the prevention and repression of corruption, the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, and the environment. The few instruments not yet ratified will shortly be ratified and past reservations not yet withdrawn will shortly be withdrawn."

Having stated what the Rwanda Minister of Justice of Rwanda said in 2005, I will like to come back home and state what Ahidjo said as elucidated in the Southern Cameroons case in Banjul

In 1959 some perceptive minds in the Trusteeship Council expressed concerns that after attaining independence on 1 January 1960 Republique du Cameroun could try to annex the Southern Cameroons. The Premier of French Cameroun, Mr. Ahidjo, denied any such intention or the possibility of any such action on the part of independent Republique du Cameroun. At the 849^th meeting of the Fourth Committee of the UN, Mr. Ahidjo took the floor and gave the UN the solemn assurance that Republique du Cameroun is not annexationist. He declared: "We are not annexationists. … If our brothers of the British zone wish to unite with independent Cameroun, we are ready to discuss the matter with them, but we will do so on a footing of equality." 

In June 1960 he told the 'Agence Presse Camerounaise': "I have said and repeated, in the name of the Government [of Republique du Cameroun], that we do not have any annexationist design."

In July the same year he again reassured the international community through the same press: "For us, there can be no question of annexation of the Southern Cameroons. We have envisaged a flexible form of union, a federal form." (above 3 paragraphs called from Merits stage in Banjul case)

The question is what legal obligations if any are created by such statements and are they binding and actionable or they are just sales puff?.

In order to answer the above question, it is pertinent to deal with the Rwanda case first and then see what inference Southern Cameroons can draw from the Ahidjo situation.

In the Case concerning armed activities on the territory of the Congo (New Application) 2000, Democratic Republic of the Congo vs. Rwanda, Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Court (ICJ) examined Rwanda's argument that it cannot be legally bound by the statement in question inasmuch as a statement made not by a Foreign Minister or a Head of Government "with automatic authority to bind the State in matters of international relations, but by a Minister of Justice, cannot bind the State to lift a particular reservation". In the case of Ahidjo, he made his statements as President of La Republique du Cameroon.

In this connection, the Court observes that, in accordance with its consistent jurisprudence (Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, pp. 269-270, paras. 49-51; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 622, para. 44; Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, pp. 21-22, para. 53; see also Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway), Judgment, 1933, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 53, p. 71), it is a well-established rule of international law that the Head of State, the Head of Government and the Minister for Foreign Affairs are deemed to represent the State merely by virtue of exercising their functions, including for the performance, on behalf of the said State, of unilateral acts having the force of international commitments.

The Court moreover recalls that, in the matter of the conclusion of treaties, this rule of customary law finds expression in Article 7, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which provides that

"By virtue of their functions and without having to produce full powers, the following are considered as representing their State:

(a) Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of performing all acts relating to the conclusion of a treaty".

The Court notes, however, that with increasing frequency in modern international relations other persons representing a State in specific fields may be authorized by that State to bind it by their statements in respect of matters falling within their purview. This may be true, for example, of holders of technical ministerial portfolios exercising powers in their field of competence in the area of foreign relations, and even of certain officials.

In this case, the Court notes first that Ms Mukabagwiza spoke before the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in her capacity as Minister of Justice of Rwanda and that she indicated inter alia that she was making her statement "on behalf of the Rwandan people". The Court further notes that the questions relating to the protection of human rights which were the subject of that statement fall within the purview of a Minister of Justice. It is the Court's view that the possibility cannot be ruled out in principle that a Minister of Justice may, under certain circumstances, bind the State he or she represents by his or her statements.

The Court cannot therefore accept Rwanda's argument that Ms Mukabagwiza could not, by her statement, bind the Rwandan State internationally, merely because of the nature of the functions that she exercised.

 

If even a mere Minister of Justice in her domain in the appropriate forum can make a statement and great legal and binding obligations on her country, it ipso facto follows that statements made by Ahidjo in the UN that La Republique will not annex Southern Cameroons creates a legal and binding obligation on La Republique du Cameroun.

In order to determine the legal effect of that statement, the Court must, however, examine its actual content as well as the circumstances in which it was made (Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, pp. 269-270, para. 51; Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, pp. 573-574, paras. 39-40).

On the first point, the Court recalls that a statement of this kind can create legal obligations only if it is made in clear and specific terms (see Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France) (New Zealand v. France), I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 267, para. 43; p. 269, para. 51; p. 472, para. 46; p. 474, para. 53).

Ahidjo's statement at the UN that La Republique du Cameroun will not annex Southern Cameroons was made in clear and specific terms hence by the courts jurisprudence, creates a binding international legal obligation on La Republique du Cameroun.

 

Conclusion

La Republique du Cameroun has an actionable legal and binding international obligation not to annex Southern Cameroons created by the unilateral declaration in the UN by Ahidjo in the course of his employment as head of state of La Republique du Cameroun.

All Southern Cameroons needs now to win the case against La Republique du Cameroun is to show that our present status is tantamount to annexation to La Republique du Cameroun. This is a clear, easy and winnable case without all the complicated joining and non joining issues that obscure the reality of our annexation and subordinate status in La Republique du Cameroon.