STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE AND THE URGENCY OF SELF-GOVERNMENT 2: My 2014 Challenge on Southern Cameroons

FULL DOCUMENT ATTACHED

The Banjul Case

THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS

COMMUNICATION NO 266/2003


DR. GUMNE & MEMBERS OF THE SCNC AND SCAPO (for themselves and on
behalf of the People of the Southern Cameroons)
V
LA REPUBLIQUE DU CAMEROUN


HEARING ON THE MERITS



SUBMISSION BY COMPLAINANTS



"We are thus faced with a situation in which Third World States,
themselves the pre-beneficiaries of resolution 1514 (XV) guaranteeing
the principle of self-determination of all peoples, become modern
colonizers of less fortunate peoples within their area." [Judge TO
Elias, President of the International Court of Justice (as he then
was), in 'The Role of the ICJ in Africa', 1 RADIC, 1989, p.8)]


INTRODUCTION

1. The substance of the complaint of the people of the Southern
Cameroons is that the rights recognized to peoples under the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights have, for the people of the
Southern Cameroons, been suppressed by Republique du Cameroun (the
Respondent State) through domination and colonization in violation of
the Charter; and that Republique du Cameroun is guilty of a series of
gross, massive, continuing and reliably attested human rights
violations in respect of named citizens and groups of citizens of the
Southern Cameroons.

2. The Commission is requested to find Republique du Cameroun (the
Respondent State) guilty of these violations; to reaffirm the
inherent, unquestionable and inalienable right of the people of the
Southern Cameroons to self-determination, and thus to the enjoyment of
all the rights recognized to peoples under the Charter; to reaffirm
the right of the people of the Southern Cameroons to live in peace and
security as a free people; to call on States parties to the Charter to
assist the people of the Southern Cameroons in their liberation
struggle against the foreign domination of Republique du Cameroun; to
call on Republique du Cameroun (Respondent State) to end its
continuing violation of the human rights of individual Southern
Cameroons citizens; and to find that victims of human rights
violations by Republique du Cameroun are entitled to adequate
compensation.

3. The facts are recounted in some detail and the law elaborately
enunciated. Reasonable minds would immediately observe that the
present communication is hugely distinguishable both on the facts and
in law from self-determination matters that the Commission has
hitherto considered, such as Katanga, Sir Dawda Jawara, and Casamance.


PART I.

THE FACTS

The territory of the Southern Cameroons

4. The Southern Cameroons has a surface area of 43,000 sq. km and a
current population of about 6 million people. It is thus
demographically bigger than at least 60 UN and 18 AU Member States,
and spatially bigger than at least 30 UN and 12 AU Member States.
Located in the 'armpit' of Africa, it is sandwiched between Nigeria
and Republique du Cameroun like a wedge between West Africa and what
in effect is still French Equatorial Africa. It has frontiers to the
west and north with Nigeria, to the east with Republique du Cameroun,
and to the south with the Equatoria Guinean Island of Bioko. The
borders are well attested by international boundary treaties.

5. The natural resources of the Southern Cameroons include oil, gas,
timber, coffee, cocoa, tea, bananas, oil palm, rubber, wildlife, fish,
medicinal plants, waterfalls and a wide variety of fruit and
agricultural produce.


80 years of British Connection

6. The territory later identified as the Southern Cameroons was
originally British from 1858-1887. It was ceded to Germany and
subsequently incorporated into the contiguous German protectorate of
Kamerun, which had been acquired earlier in 1884.

7. A 1913 Anglo-German Treaty respecting the settlement of the
frontier between the British territory of Nigeria and the German
territory of Kamerun from Lake Chad to the sea. That territorially
grounded treaty has remained the instrument defining the international
boundary between Nigeria and the Southern Cameroons. Moreover, a 1954
British Order in Council (Definition of Boundaries Proclamation)
defined the boundary between the Eastern Region of Nigeria and the
Southern Cameroons.

8. The same territory that had been ceded in 1887 by Britain to
Germany was captured by British forces in September 1914 soon after
the outbreak of World War I. It later became known as the British
Cameroons, consisting of two separate parts, the Southern Cameroons
and the Northern Cameroons.

9. Germany held on to its original Kamerun protectorate until 1916
when Anglo-French forces captured it. France took possession of the
territory and it became known as French Cameroun. In 1916 therefore,
Germany ceased to exercise any territorial authority (sovereignty)
over Kamerun. The utter defeat of Germany entailed the loss of its
colonial territory. Under Articles 118 and 119 of the 1919 Versailles
Treaties Germany renounced and relinquished all rights in and title to
all its overseas possessions, including her Kamerun territory.

10. An Anglo-French treaty of 1916 (the Milner-Simon Declaration)
defined the international boundary between the British Cameroons and
French Cameroun. This territorial delimitation was confirmed by the
League of Nations in 1922 when the two territories were separately
placed under the Mandates System. The territorial alignment was
further confirmed by the Anglo-French Treaty of 9 January 1931, signed
by the Governor-General of Nigeria and the Governor of French
Cameroun.

11. The Southern Cameroons was thus under British rule from 1858 to
1887, and then from 1915 to 1961, a total period of nearly 80 years.
That long British connection left an indelible mark on the territory,
bequeathing to it an Anglo-Saxon heritage. The territory's official
language is English. Its educational, legal, administrative,
political, governance and institutional culture and value systems are
all English-derived.


International tutelage

12. The Southern Cameroons was under international tutelage with the
status of a class 'B' territory, first as a British-Mandated Territory
of the League of Nations from 1922-1945, and then as a
British-administered United Nations Trust Territory from 1946 to 1961.

13. Under Article 22 of the Treaties of Versailles the Mandatory Power
accepted and undertook to apply "the principle that the well-being and
development of [the inhabitants of the territories concerned] form a
sacred trust of civilization." At the end of World War II the
international mandates system was transmuted to the international
trusteeship system under chapters XII and XIII of the UN Charter.

14. By Article 73 of that Charter the Administering Power "recognize
the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of [territories
whose peoples have not yet attained a measure of self-government] are
paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to
the utmost, within the system of international peace and security
established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants
of those territories." One of the basic objectives of the
international trusteeship system, as stated in Article 76 b of the
Charter, is "to promote the political, economic, social, and
educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories,
and their progressive development towards self-government or
independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of
each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the
peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each
trusteeship agreement."


15. Up to 1960, the Southern Cameroons though under international
tutelage was administered by Britain as part of her contiguous
colonial territory of Nigeria. But its distinct identity and
personality, separate from Nigeria, remained unassailable. UN
Resolution 224 (III) of 18 November 1948 protected the Trust Territory
from annexation by any colonial-minded neighbour. While acknowledging
that the Trusteeship Agreement makes allowance for 'administrative
union', the Resolution provides that "Such a union must remain
strictly administrative in its nature and scope, and its operation
must not have the effect of creating any conditions which will
obstruct the separate development of the Trust Territory, in the
fields of political, economic, social and educational advancement, as
a distinct entity."


Self-government

16. In 1954 the Southern Cameroons became a self-governing region
within Nigeria and gradually asserted its distinct identity and its
aspiration to statehood through increased political and institutional
autonomy.

17. In 1958 the British Government stated at the UN that the Southern
Cameroons was expected to achieve in 1960 the objectives set forth in
Article 76 b of the UN Charter. Since the Southern Cameroons had
already attained self-government status four years earlier in 1954,
the objective to be attained in 1960 could only have been full
independence. General Assembly Resolution 1282 (XIII) of 5 December
1958 took note of the British statement. The people of the Southern
Cameroons therefore legitimately expected to be granted full
independence in 1960 given that their country had been self-governing
since 1954.

18. Basic self-government institutions were in place: a Government
headed by the Premier as Leader of Government business; a bicameral
parliament consisting of a House of Assembly and a House of Chiefs; an
Official Opposition in parliament; a Judiciary headed by a Chief
Justice; a Civil Service; and a police force. The system in place was
a democratic and accountable dispensation; a Westminster-type
parliamentary democracy. In 1959 when the term of office of the
incumbent Premier came to an end peaceful free, fair and transparent
elections were organized. The opposition won and there was an orderly
transfer of power to the in-coming Premier. Consistently with the
parliamentary system of government the out-going Premier became Leader
of the Opposition in parliament.

19. On 1 October 1960 the Southern Cameroons was separated from
Nigeria. The Southern Cameroons Constitution Order in Council came
into force. By 1960 the Southern Cameroons had attained a full measure
of self-government. Indeed, from 1 October 1960 up to 30 September
1961 it was a full self-governing territory fully responsible for all
its internal affairs, except for defense over which matter, along with
foreign affairs, Britain continued to exercise jurisdiction.

20. Quite apart from the fact that the territory had international
personality by virtue of its status as an international trust
territory, the Southern Cameroons was a state in the process of being
born and was known by the sovereign name of Government of the Southern
Cameroons. Its sovereignty was in abeyance waiting to emerge at the
moment of its expected independence.


French Cameroun achieves independence as Republique du Cameroun

21. On 1 January 1960, the contiguous territory of French Cameroun,
also a class B trust territory, achieved independence from France, the
chronic on-going anarchy and terrorism there notwithstanding. The
French had decided that 1960 was to be the year of 'independence' for
its African colonies.

22. French Cameroun achieved independence under the name and style of
Republique du Cameroun with Mr. Ahmadou Ahidjo as its President. It
was admitted to membership of the United Nations on 20 September 1960.

23. The name 'Republique du Cameroun' is variously translated into
English as 'Republic of Cameroun' or 'Republic of Cameroon' or
sometimes simply as 'Cameroon'. However; prudence and clarity dictate
that one sticks to the official name in the language in which it is
expressed. Accordingly, for the avoidance of confusion, that country
(the Respondent State in this matter) shall, throughout these
proceedings be referred to by its official denomination 'Republique du
Cameroun' except where the context dictates otherwise.


Plebiscite recommended by UN

24. On 13 March 1959 the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1350
(XIII) recommending a plebiscite in the Southern Cameroons instead of
the granting of independence right away. This was followed by another
General Assembly resolution, 1352 (XIV) of 16 October 1959, ordering a
plebiscite to be held in the Southern Cameroons "not later than March
1961". The people of the Southern Cameroons were to pronounce
themselves on 'achieving independence' by the two dead-end
alternatives of 'joining' Nigeria or Republique du Cameroun.


'We are not annexationists'

25. In 1959 some perceptive minds in the Trusteeship Council expressed
concerns that after attaining independence on 1 January 1960
Republique du Cameroun could try to annex the Southern Cameroons. The
Premier of French Cameroun, Mr. Ahidjo, denied any such intention or
the possibility of any such action on the part of independent
Republique du Cameroun. At the 849th meeting of the Fourth Committee
of the UN, Mr. Ahidjo took the floor and gave the UN the solemn
assurance that Republique du Cameroun is not annexationist. He
declared: "We are not annexationists. … If our brothers of the British
zone wish to unite with independent Cameroun, we are ready to discuss
the matter with them, but we will do so on a footing of equality."

26. In June 1960 he told the 'Agence Presse Camerounaise': "I have
said and repeated, in the name of the Government [of Republique du
Cameroun], that we do not have any annexationist design."

27. In July the same year he again reassured the international
community through the same press: "For us, there can be no question of
annexation of the Southern Cameroons. We have envisaged a flexible
form of union, a federal form."

28. Later events were to show that he took the UN, the international
community and the Southern Cameroons for a ride.


Plebiscite process set in motion

29. On 31 March 1960 the Trusteeship Council adopted Resolution 2013
(XXVI) requesting the UK Government "to take appropriate steps, in
consultation with the authorities concerned, to ensure that the people
of the Territory are fully informed, before the plebiscite, of the
constitutional arrangements that would have to be made, at the
appropriate time, for the implementation of the decisions taken at the
plebiscite."

30. Resolution 2013 saddled the UK Government with a duty to ascertain
from both Nigeria and Republique du Cameroun the terms and conditions
under which the Southern Cameroons might be expected to 'join' either
of them. After making the ascertainment Britain was duty bound to
inform the people of the Southern Cameroons, well before the
plebiscite, of the conditions of 'joining' offered by each of the two
concerned States.

31. Given the artful dilatoriness of the UK Government on this issue
the Southern Cameroons entered into direct talks with Republique du
Cameroun. Several rounds of talks were held between August and
December 1960. These talks resulted in an Agreement (expressed in the
form of Joint Declarations and Joint Communiqués) signed by Mr. JN
Foncha and Mr. Ahmadou Ahidjo, the respective political leaders of the
two countries, and published.

32. In the meantime also, in early October 1960, the British Secretary
of State for the Colonies held talks in London with a delegation of
Southern Cameroons Ministers and members of the Opposition. The aims
of the talks included elucidating the meaning of the phrase 'to
achieve independence by joining Republique du Cameroun'.

33. The Secretary of State put forward the following interpretation as
consistent with the plebiscite alternative of 'joining' Republique du
Cameroun: "the Southern Cameroons and the Cameroun Republic would
unite in a Federal United Cameroon Republic. The arrangements [for the
union] would be worked out after the plebiscite by a conference
consisting of representative delegations of equal status from the
Republic and the Southern Cameroons. The United Nations and the United
Kingdom would also be associated with this conference."

34. Both the Southern Cameroons and Republique du Cameroun agreed to
this interpretation.


Pre-Plebiscite Agreement

35. The signed and published Agreement between the Southern Cameroons
and Republique du Cameroun provided that in the event of the
plebiscite vote going in favour of "achieving independence by joining"
Republique du Cameroun, the following would be the broad terms of the
'joining':

• The Southern Cameroons and Republique du Cameroun would unite to
create a Federal State to be called the 'Federal United Cameroon
Republic', outside the British Commonwealth and the French Community;
• The component states of the Federation would be the Southern
Cameroons and Republique du Cameroun, legally equal in status;
• Each federated state would continue to conduct its affairs
consistently with its colonially-inherited state-culture, with only a
limited number of subject matters conceded to the Union government;
• Nationals of the federated states would enjoy Federal Cameroon nationality;
• The Federation would have a bicameral Parliament consisting of a
Federal Senate and a Federal National Assembly; and
• Federal laws will only be enacted in such a way that no measures
contrary to the interests of one state will be imposed upon it by the
majority.

The Agreement also stipulated as follows:

• Constitutional arrangements would be worked out after the plebiscite
by a post-plebiscite conference comprising representative delegations
of equal status from the Southern Cameroons and Republique du
Cameroun, in association with the United Kingdom Government and the
United Nations;
• The post-plebiscite conference would have as its goal the fixing of
time limits and conditions for the transfer of sovereignty powers to
an organization representing the future federation;
• Those entrusted with the affairs of the united Cameroon would put
the would-be federal constitution to the people of the Southern
Cameroons and Republique du Cameroun to pronounce themselves on it;
and
• Until constitutional arrangements were worked out, the United
Kingdom would continue to fulfill her responsibility under the
Trusteeship Agreement regarding the Southern Cameroons.

36. On December 24, 1960, Republique du Cameroun sent a Note Verbale
to the British Government reiterating its commitment to this Agreement
and reconfirming its desire for union with the Southern Cameroons "on
the basis of a Federation".

37. The Agreement between the Southern Cameroons and Republique du
Cameroun was made available to the UN and the UK Government. The
representations therein contained were reproduced in 'The Two
Alternatives', a booklet prepared by the United Kingdom Government,
published and widely circulated in the Southern Cameroons in pursuance
of Resolution 2013 with a view to informing the Southern Cameroons
electorate of the constitutional implications of the alternatives
offered in the plebiscite. Also reproduced in 'The Two Alternatives'
was the interpretation of the 'alternative' of 'joining'Republique du
Cameroun put forward by the British Secretary of State for the
Colonies and concurred with by both the Southern Cameroons Government
and Republique du Cameroun. The booklet was widely used during the
plebiscite enlightenment campaigns.

38. The phrase "to achieve independence by joining Republique du
Cameroun" was therefore clearly understood by all concerned (the UN,
the UK Government, the Southern Cameroons Government, and the
Republique du Cameroun Government) to mean that the Southern Cameroons
would attain independence and then form, on the footing of legal
equality, a federal union with Republique du Cameroun under an agreed
federal constitution.

39. On 11 February 1961 the UN-supervised limited plebiscite took
place in the Southern Cameroons. The vote was a plebiscite on
political status to enable the people of the Southern Cameroons
progress from full measure of self-government to national
independence. The vote went in favour of achieving independence 'by
joining' Republique du Cameroun rather than Nigeria.


UN Resolution 1608

40. Two months after the plebiscite vote, on 21 April 1961, the UN
General Assembly adopted Resolution 1608 (XV) to give effect to the
intention expressed by the people of the Southern Cameroons at the
plebiscite. Republique du Cameroun, through its Foreign Affairs
Minister, Mr. Charles Okala, made a vain vociferous and pathetic
protest against the taking of a vote on the independence of the
Southern Cameroons and then voted against Resolution 1608. It speaks
volumes that the overwhelming UN vote on the independence of the
Southern Cameroons did not go down well with Republique du Cameroun.

41. In Resolution 1608 (XV) the General Assembly:

• Endorsed the results of the plebiscite that "the people of the
Southern Cameroons … decided to achieve independence by joining the
independent Republic of Cameroun";
• Considered that "the decision made by them through a democratic
process under the supervision of the United Nations should be
immediately implemented";
• Decided that "the Trusteeship Agreement of 13 December 1946
concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom administration … be
terminated, in accordance with Article 76 b of the Charter of the
United Nations … with respect to the Southern Cameroons, on 1 October
1961, upon its joining the Republic of Cameroun"; and
• Invited "the Administering Authority, the Government of the Southern
Cameroons and the Republic of Cameroun to initiate urgent discussions
with a view to finalizing before 1 October 1961 the arrangements by
which the agreed and declared policies of the parties concerned will
be implemented."


42. "The agreed and declared policies of the parties concerned"
referred to in the Resolution were the contents of the signed and
published pre-plebiscite Agreement between the Southern Cameroons and
Republique du Cameroun reproduced in the plebiscite enlightenment
campaign booklet entitled 'The Two Alternatives'.

43. The said 'agreed and declared policies' were not and have never
been finalized.


Foumban and the de facto federation

44. From the 17th to the 21st of July 1961 the Southern Cameroons and
Republique du Cameroun held talks in the town of Foumban in Republique
du Cameroun with a view to fleshing up the outline of the federal
constitution (agreed upon before the plebiscite) and to finalize the
same.

45. The talks ended inconclusively as a result of the duplicitous
conduct and manifest bad faith of Republique du Cameroun, aided and
abetted in this by the French who would later claim that the Southern
Cameroons was "un petit cadeaux de la reine d'Angleterre" ("a little
gift from the English Queen").

46. The press in Republique du Cameroun has recently revealed that at
Foumban Republique du Cameroun, acting in pursuance of a premeditated
plan, fraudulently and corruptly deflected the Southern Cameroons
delegation from the serious business at hand and thereby scuttled the
Foumban talks.

47. Even the agreement to resume talks at a latter date on the
would-be federal constitution was ignored by Republique du Cameroun
despite repeated reminders by the Southern Cameroons.

48. Without the process of negotiating the terms of the agreed federal
union having been completed, without any federal constituent assembly
having met, without any draft federal constitution having been
established, Republique du Cameroun unilaterally drafted a document
which that country's Assembly, meeting without any Southern Cameroons
participation, enacted into 'law' on 1 September 1961 as 'the
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Cameroon' to enter into force
on 1 October 1961.

49. The component states of the federation were identified as
Republique du Cameroun (to be called East Cameroun) and the Southern
Cameroons (to be called West Cameroon). Strangely, the long title of
the 'constitution' characterized the document as a revision of the
1960 Constitution of Republique du Cameroun necessitated by the need
to facilitate the return of a part of the territory of Republique du
Cameroun. The document was thus in the nature of an annexation law
thinly disguised as a 'federal constitution'. For, Republique du
Cameroun could not at one and the same breadth be one of two component
states of a federation and yet absorb the other component state, the
Southern Cameroons. Nor can the legislature of a future component of a
yet-to-be federation validly act as the legislature of that merely
contemplated federation.

50. In September 1961 the Trusteeship regarding the Southern Cameroons
had not yet been terminated and Republique du Cameroun has always been
a foreign State in regard to the Southern Cameroons. Republique du
Cameroun had no jurisdiction whatsoever over the Southern Cameroons
and could thus not validly exercise constituent powers over the
territory. Neither the legislature nor the executive of Republique du
Cameroun could validly legislate for the contemplated federation.

51. Republique du Cameroun's unilateral 'federal constitution' was
never submitted for endorsement to and was never endorsed by the
people or the parliament or the Government of the Southern Cameroons.


The Ebubu and Santa slaughters

52. In the same month of September 1961 a platoon of Republique du
Cameroon soldiers crossed the border into the Southern Cameroons at
Ebubu village near Tombel and massacred thirteen CDC workers in cold
blood. No explanation or apology was offered by Republique du Cameroun
to the Government of the Southern Cameroons. Further north, in the
village of Santa near Bamenda, marauding soldiers from Republique du
Cameroun crossed the Southern Cameroons border into the village of
Santa near Bamenda, killed a number of people and destroyed property.
They were eventually flushed out by a company of British soldiers. But
once again Republique du Cameroun offered neither explanation nor
apology for yet another armed violation of the territorial integrity
of the Southern Cameroons.

53. In 1962 Mr. Zachariah Abendong MP in the Southern Cameroons
parliament was brutally murdered in the vicinity of Kekem in
Republique du Cameroun. In the same year a Camerounese gendarme
murdered in cold blood two Southern Cameroons youths arbitrarily
detained by the very gendarmes in the Southern Cameroons town of Bota.
There was never any inquiry into the circumstances of these murders
and the soldiers who carried out those extra-judicial killings were
never brought to book.


Onset of the armed occupation of the Southern Cameroons

54. On 25 September 1961 the British Queen issued a proclamation
declaring that the British Government "shall as from the first day of
October 1961 cease to be responsible for the administration of the
Southern Cameroons." The British Government then began to withdraw its
personnel from the territory, culminating in the departure of its
troops on September 30th 1961. The territory was left defenseless as
it had no military force of its own. Republique du Cameroun moved in
its military forces without the concurrence of the Government of the
Southern Cameroons. Those forces occupied the territory and have
remained in occupation since then, a situation indistinguishable from
belligerent occupation.

55. On 1 October 1961 the British Government and the UN washed their
hands off the Southern Cameroons, leaving the political status of the
territory and the fate of its people in limbo. The British Government
declared that "the Southern Cameroons and its inhabitants were
expendable." (Declassified Secret Files on the Southern Cameroons,
P.R.O., London) The attitude of the UN is all the more surprising when
it is recalled that the World Body had drafted constitutions for the
Ethiopia/Eritrea federation and also for what is now the Democratic
Republic of Congo.

56. On that same day a de facto Cameroon Federation came into
existence. Sovereignty over the Southern Cameroons that had
supposedly achieved independence on that day was never handed over to
the Government of the Southern Cameroons (which would then have handed
it to a legitimate federal government) but apparently to Mr. Ahidjo,
President of Republique du Cameroun, and the self-declared head of a
yet-to-be-formed federal government.


Revealing provisions of de facto federal constitution

57. The 'Federal Constitution' unilaterally drafted and enacted by
Republique du Cameroun contained some revealing provisions. The
President of Republique du Cameroun gave himself absolute powers under
Article 50 to rule by decree during the first six months of the
federation. Article 54 made provision for the composition of federal
parliamentarians in proportion to the number of inhabitants of each
Federated State in the ratio of one parliamentarian to 80,000
inhabitants. The constitution put the population of the Southern
Cameroons at 800, 000 and that of Republique du Cameroun at 3, 200,
000, thus yielding 10 parliamentarians for the Southern Cameroons and
40 for Republique du Cameroun, in the Federal National Assembly. This
inconsequential 'representation' was designed to ensure that the
Southern Cameroons influenced neither legislation nor policy in the
federation

58. Article 56 enacted that "on 1 October 1961 the Government of the
Republic of Southern Cameroon … and the Government of the Republic of
Cameroun shall become the Governments of the two Federated States
respectively." Article 59 stated that the French text of the
constitution was the authoritative version.

59. These telling provisions were later expunged from the constitution
but without in fact changing the factual situation created by them.

60. Conspicuously absent from the document were certain key matters
the Southern Cameroons had insisted on during pre- and post-plebiscite
talks with Republique du Cameroun: robust state autonomy, a
constitutional Bill of Rights, a Federal Senate and judicial
independence.

61. However, there was no provision in the document to the effect
that the Southern Cameroons and Republique du Cameroun shall be united
in one sovereign Republic; no provision to the effect that the
federation was 'one and indivisible'; and no claim that the document
represented consensus ad idem of the Southern Cameroons and Republique
du Cameroun. The political authorities of Republique du Cameroun were
and remained in the driver's seat of the de facto federation. Aware
that the federation lacked a legally valid founding document and that
it had a mere de facto existence, those authorities never applied for
UN membership of the federation and so the federation was never a
member of the UN.


Onset of reign of terror in the Southern Cameroons

62. In his unilateral Federal Constitution the President of Republique
du Cameroun declared himself President of the Federation. In early
October 1961 he issued a proclamation placing the Southern Cameroons
under a state of emergency for six months renewable ad infinitum, a
situation that has more or less remained unchanged to this day.

63. He also issued a decree extending to the Southern Cameroons the
pass system in force in Republique du Cameroun. The system required
any person intending to travel from one district to another or from
one town to another to obtain a laissez-passer from the military or
police authorities and to exhibit the same to those authorities on
demand at any checkpoint, under pain of arrest and imprisonment.

64. Another decree also extended the 'carte d'identite' system to the
Southern Cameroons. The system requires all persons aged eighteen and
above to carry on their person at all times a document called 'carte
d'identite nationale' and to produce it at any time and place on
demand by the police or military authorities, under pain of arrest and
imprisonment. The card contains details about the holder: his names,
the names of his father and mother, his date and place of birth, his
profession, his place of abode, his thumb print, his signature, and
body identification marks.

65. Other decrees followed notably the 1962 Subversion Ordinance, the
1966 law on press censorship, and the 1967 law proscribing meetings
and associations. This latter law effectively outlawed civil society
organizations and the formation of political parties. These laws
seriously eroded the civil and political rights the people of the
Southern Cameroons were accustomed to enjoying during the period of
British colonial rule.

66. The activities of the sinister Gestapo-modeled secret police in
Republique du Cameroun, deceptively named documentation and research
centre (first known by the acronym DIRDOC then later SEDOC and finally
CND), were extended to the Southern Cameroons together with infamous
torture units called 'Brigade Mobile Mixtes' (BMM). These structures
tortured or disappeared persons who dared to oppose the political
status quo. Among the Southern Cameroonian victims of these structures
is Mr. Mukong who miraculously survived twelve years of gruesome
detention and torture and was able, in his book Prisoner Without A
Crime, to record in graphic detail for posterity the frightening modus
operandi of these outfits.

67. As early as December 1961 another ordinance extended to the
Southern Cameroons the system of civilian-targeted military tribunals
existing in Republique du Cameroun, much to the consternation of the
people of the territory. A permanent military tribunal was set up in
Buea, capital of the Southern Cameroons. Like those in Republique du
Cameroun it was composed of a civilian magistrate and two army
officers, citizens of Republique du Cameroun. It had jurisdiction to
try civilians for an array of ill-defined offences under the
subversion ordinance and other decrees, such as subversive activities,
offences against state security, possession of fire-arms or
ammunition, contempt of the President, ridiculing public authority,
inciting hatred against the Government, dissemination of false news,
and any offence of whatever nature in an area subject to a state of
emergency or other exceptional circumstances (a state of emergency had
early been declared over the Southern Cameroons) committed even by
civilians.

68. High profile cases of Southern Cameroonians tried in Buea or
Yaoundé (in Republique du Cameroun) include the officer of police,
Inspector Ndifor; the 143 Bakossi people arrested in Tombel in 1966;
the journalists Martin Yai, JF Gwellem, Martin Che, Peter Etah Oben;
and the publisher SN Tita. In a Cameroon Times publication of February
1970 the journalists expressed the general sentiments of the people of
the Southern Cameroons when they observed that the Camerounese forces
in the Southern Cameroons were by their conduct indistinguishable from
colonial forces of occupation.

69. The state of emergency provided and continues to provide the
'legal' basis for the military forces of Republique du Cameroun to
subject the people of the Southern Cameroons to all kinds of abuse,
terror and harassment. Taken together, the active enforcement of the
state of emergency, the ubiquity of the 'force armee et gendarmerie',
the indiscriminate application of the subversion ordinance, and the
activities of the military tribunals and the secret police had the
effect of unleashing a veritable reign of terror in the Southern
Cameroons.


The 'ratissage' (cordon and search operation)

70. A typical method of abuse, torture and other inhuman and degrading
treatment is the 'ratissage' (or 'caler-caler', in the language of
those foreign forces). A method of psychological warfare used by the
French to enforce their colonial rule in Vietnam, Algeria and French
Cameroun, the 'ratissage' is a cordon and search operation, an
encirclement and dragnet manoeuvre, periodically carried out by
military forces against the population.

71. This subjugation and terrorization strategy is meant to impress on
the people of the Southern Cameroons that they are hopeless, powerless
and that any contemplated resistance to Republique du Cameroun
occupation would be futile.

72. Routinely carried out, the operation followed a fairly
standardized pattern. As early as 4 a.m. heavily armed military forces
would invade a pre-selected town or village; moving systematically
from house to house; breaking in if the occupant hesitated to open at
the first command to do so; moving from street to street, from one
locale to another; demanding each person to produce their carte
d'identite, ticket d'impot, recepisse, recu, carte du parti, patente,
permis de conduire, laissez-passer, carte de sejour, or other 'pieces'
(documents) the soldiers chose to ask.

73. People are forced out of their homes at gunpoint, herded like
cattle into an open space, tortured and humiliated. Forms of
dehumanization include being forced to sit on wet grass or ground, on
mud, on dust, or on dirty water ponds on the roadside, as well as
being forced to kneel on sand, gravel, stones or other road surface
facing and looking at the sun. The hapless people are ordered to put
their hands on their heads like captured prisoners of war and forced
to sing insulting and obscene songs about their spouses and parents,
or derogatory songs about God, and to dance or run around, sometimes
naked, to amuse the soldiers. Anyone who failed to comply with any of
these commands received the butt of the gun, kicks in the groin, or
slaps in the face. As if all this was not enough it was not uncommon
for the soldiers involved in this operation to rape women, steal
property, and unlawfully detain people in the 'commissariat de police'
or 'brigade de la gendarmerie' for days and weeks on end without
charge.


The confession of a colonialist

74. Addressing his political party in July 1962, Mr. Ahidjo
(self-declared federal President) confessed that Republique du
Cameroun had in effect annexed the Southern Cameroons using the ploy
of a pretended federation. He said: "The reunification of the Southern
Cameroons and Republique du Cameroun did not necessitate a fundamental
change of the constitution of Republique du Cameroun, but only a minor
amendment to allow for part of the territory to rejoin the motherland.
… It was Republique du Cameroun which had to transform itself into a
federation, taking into account the return to it of a part of its
territory, a part possessing certain special characteristics."

75. There could be no clearer admission of annexation or colonization
of the Southern Cameroons by Republique du Cameroun. For, the claim
that the territory of the Southern Cameroons was/is a part of the
territory of Republique du Cameroun is an egregious falsehood legally,
historically, culturally and politically.


Domination of the people of the Southern Cameroons

76. The de facto Cameroon Federation lasted a mere ten years. During
those years the people of Republique du Cameroun systematically
increased their domination of the people of Southern Cameroons. This
domination manifested itself in several ways:

• The Federal Government was essentially a Republique du Cameroun
monopoly. The Southern Cameroons had only a small and token presence
in all the three branches of government, executive, legislative,
judicial and therefore could not take or influence any policy
decision;
• The military and police have always been entirely French in training
and language and have always been a Republique du Cameroun
institution;
• Mr. Ahidjo, President of Republique du Cameroun and the
self-appointed federal President carved the federation into six
administrative regions, each headed by an 'Inspecteur federal
d'administration' native of Republique du Cameroun, along the
'constitutionally' established two constituent federated states, each
headed by a Prime Minister. The Southern Cameroons was decreed an
administrative region. Taxonomically this meant it was concurrently a
federated state (self-governing) and an administrative region (under
Republique du Cameroun tutelage, for the 'Inspecteur' was always a
citizen of Republique du Cameroun appointed by Ahidjo and directly
answerable to him; and his office was deemed to be superordinate to
that of the Prime Minister of the Southern Cameroons). Ahidjo thus
created an administrative system that basically ignored the underlying
principle of federalism. He did this to keep up the fiction that the
Southern Cameroons was indeed part of the territory of Republique du
Cameroun;
• Ahidjo gnawed into such powers as the Southern Cameroons had and
basically deprived it of revenue-raising powers, thus making it
dependent on federal subsidies grudgingly and erratically allocated.
The Southern Cameroons Prime Minister deplored this system of ad hoc
subsidies and wondered aloud how a state could develop by itself
according to its priorities if it cannot know how much revenue it has
at its disposal.
• Ahidjo arrogated to himself the power to appoint and dismiss the
Prime Minister and Ministers of the Government of the Southern
Cameroons notwithstanding the fact that the state operated a
parliamentary system of government.
• The Southern Cameroons was ordered to switch over from left to right
hand driving. The unit of money in the Southern Cameroons had all
along been the pound. In 1962 it was abolished. The franc cfa in use
in Republique du Cameroun was over-valued in relation to the pound and
then extended to the Southern Cameroons with disastrous consequences
for the Southern Cameroons Government and for individuals who had
savings.
• In 1966 Ahidjo, a consummate manipulator, deceitfully manoeuvered
the political parties in the Southern Cameroons and decreed a
one-party state, thereby ending multiparty politics in the Southern
Cameroons. The stranglehold of Republique du Cameroun over the
Southern Cameroons was now virtually complete.
• Republique du Cameroun also set about destroying the economic base
of the Southern Cameroons. Bananas, exported to Britain under
Commonwealth preference tariffs, were a major source of income for the
Southern Cameroons Government. By bringing the Southern Cameroons
economy within the customs arrangement of what is in effect still
French Equatorial Africa the preferential tariffs were ended. The
French preferred to buy bananas from French-owned companies in
Republique du Cameroun. The Southern Cameroons could not therefore
sell its bananas and suffered a heavy loss of revenue. The Southern
Cameroons' main agro-industry, the Cameroons Development Corporation
(CDC), and private banana farmers abandoned banana farming.
• Southern Cameroons' seaports, Victoria and Tiko were teeming with
activities. Victoria was a vibrant commercial city with thriving firms
such as John Holt Ltd, Cadbury and Fry, Unilever, UCTC, CCC, and
Britind Company Ltd. Kumba district produces abundant foodstuff of
various variety, timber, cocoa and coffee. In order to induce a
dependency syndrome in the Southern Cameroons, Republique du Cameroun
constructed from Douala, its main and dredging port, a road linking it
to Victoria and a narrow gauge rail line linking the same city to
Kumba. The Victoria and Tiko seaports were then decreed closed. The
commercial companies were then forced to relocate to Douala. People
now had to travel 80 km all the way to Douala for shopping. Cash crop
and food produce harvested from Kumba were henceforth being taken to
Douala. A vivid account of the economic strangulation and ruination of
the Southern Cameroons is given in J. Banjamin, Les Camerounais
Occidentaux.

77. The de facto federation was thus not conceived to operate and did
not operate in a manner fully consistent with the aspirations of the
people of the Southern Cameroons. Republique du Cameroun frustrated
the freely expressed wishes of the people of the Southern Cameroons to
independence. It set in motion the process of forcing the people of
the Southern Cameroons into Republique du Cameroun mould in a hopeless
homogenizing quest designed to result in the complete extinguishment
of the separate and distinct identity of the people of the Southern
Cameroons.





On 12/31/13, Ofege Ntemfac <ntemfacnchwete@gmail.com> wrote:
> Government and governance or governing = the use of commonwealth
> resources to provide basic services unto the governed.
> The governed can only be folks living within their own legit territory
> which territory has recognition under International Law.
> Basic services = schools+hospitals+roads+jobs+the economic wellbeing.
> Government and governance or governing is not about gendarmes+military
> governors+unelected sous prefets and subservience or public order.
> And whenever a government becomes destructive to the provision of
> basic services it behooves upon the citizenry to rise up in MIGHT and
> abrogate that government.
> Especially when the so-called government is nothing but a colonial
> contraption enforcing
> colonisation+neocolonisation+assimilation+anexation+subjugation+slavery
> and enslavement+economic cleansing+structural violence+genocide on
> the annexed and the colonised.
> International Law speaks of self-determination or the right of every
> people to cast out colonissation and modern slavery.
> In that lofty quest for self-gvernment.
> In the picture attached do note that the enslaved children are in BLUE&
> Just as Freedomland is about the blue skies of a FREE and FREED PEOPLE.
>
> On 12/30/13, jtagne <jtagne@yahoo.com> wrote:
>> Massa Agbor
>>
>> More and more interesting. ..Please let him know that again about our
>> unified Cameroon. ..
>>
>> Tell him that in his USA Denver for instance people self govern reason
>> why
>> they can grow and sell their green while in Virginia they can't for now
>> all
>> this in the same country call America.
>>
>> Hahaha I may join your party with my good friend Sam Esale former what so
>> ever of this evil regime of biya paul call cpdm. ..
>>
>>
>> Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note® II, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone
>>
>> -------- Original message --------
>> From: Agbor Enow Augustine <Enow007@yahoo.com>
>> Date: 12/30/2013 11:22 (GMT-05:00)
>> To: camnetwork@yahoogroups.com,cameroon_politics@yahoogroups.com
>> Cc: FREE_Ambazonians@yahoogroups.com,Cameroon SDF
>> <cameroons_sdf_party@yahoogroups.com>
>> Subject: Re: [camnetwork] My 2014 Challenge on Southern Cameroons
>>
>>
>> Can you tell this forum why self-rule is bad for Southern Cameroons? I
>> get
>> the argument that other Cameroonians are not better off, but how does
>> that
>> make self-government bad for Southern Cameroonians? How, in the absence
>> of
>> self-rule, is the current situation different from colonization? (Boh
>> Herbert)
>>
>> The so called Southern Cameroons can not talk of self-rule,
>> because it lacks the legitimacy and sovereignty to do so; and would be
>> secessionist movements like the SCNC lacks the mandate from the very
>> people
>> they claim their subversive activities shall benefit. The coalition of
>> the
>> discontent few, who have constituted themselves into would be
>> secessionist
>> movements without followers are anti-nationalist. Their actions do not
>> reduce the capacity of junta Paul Biya's regime to plunder state
>> resources,
>> but in effect sustain the regime by pitting Cameroonians against one
>> another, strengthening the divide-and-rule tactics of the dictator. This
>> distracts attention from the actual problems faced by the people in their
>> daily lives.
>> Former Southern Cameroon has genuine expressions of cultural,
>> economic, and social grievances: Poverty and inequality of opportunities,
>> a
>> situation that affects 100 percent of the country, including the Littoral
>> and Central provinces is one of them. Another is the attempt to make
>> Cameroon a French speaking country, which I have said before will never
>> work.
>> Yes, it is true that the government of junta Biya has
>> deliberately ignored legitimate grievances from minority groups, but who
>> wants to listen to such grievances if the under 500 people behind the so
>> called Anglophone movements propagate callous secessionist claims.
>> We are finalizing the manifesto for the newly constituted
>> Cameroon Peoples Nationalist Alliance and Mr. Boh Herbert will read more
>> about this question. But the Republic of Cameroon remains a unified
>> nation
>> or cultural community with a shared history, languages, religions arts
>> and
>> music etc. The question of whether Southern Cameroons can govern itself is
>> a
>> distraction, because Southern Cameroon died in 1961.
>>
>> Augustine Agbor Enow
>>
>> Founder and Convener
>> Cameroon Peoples Nationalist Alliance (CPNA)
>>
>>
>> The outcome of my life is not more than three lines:
>> I was a raw material
>> I became mature and cooked
>> And I was burned into nothingness.
>> Rumi
>>
>>
>> On Monday, December 30, 2013 7:55 AM, Herbert Boh <herbertboh@yahoo.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> Happy New Year 2014 to all!!!
>>
>> For years, advocates of self-rule and the restoration of Southern
>> Cameroons
>> have argued the merits of the case they make while opponents have
>> generally
>> said "No", "No Way", "No How".
>>
>> This is my 2014 Challenge for those opposed to self-rule (not
>> decentralization) for any people (in this case, Southern Cameroonians):
>>
>> Can you tell this forum why self-rule is bad for Southern Cameroons? I
>> get
>> the argument that other Cameroonians are not better off, but how does
>> that
>> make self-government bad for Southern Cameroonians? How, in the absence
>> of
>> self-rule, is the current situation different from colonization? Please
>> don't recycle the "Balkanization" argument because Africa was never ONE
>> to
>> start with. Secondly, various countries across the continent did not say
>> "No" to independence (another word for self-government) claiming that
>> African unity will be harmed by piecemeal independence.
>>
>> Opponents of self-rule, please take advantage of this challenge in 2014
>> and
>> let us gear YOUR CASE. Who knows? You just may convince millions of us
>> with
>> your arguments.
>>
>> I will be waiting.
>>
>> Happy New Year 2014 !!!
>>
>> Boh Herbert
>>
>> Sent from my iPhone
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> --
>
>
>
> The thing always happens that you really believe in; and the belief in
> a thing makes it happen.
>


--



The thing always happens that you really believe in; and the belief in
a thing makes it happen.

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